What? Nothing except that MyMagic+ is a failure on this site?
Looks like I have to repost something I wrote a couple of months back on another Spirited thread ....
Disney has made a horrible mistake with MyMagic+.
Now that I have your attention ...
No, I’m not bashing MyMagic+. Quite the opposite. The just-released Q2 company financial results suggest that MyMagic+ could have been a key driver to financial success,
if leveraged properly. However, it looks like Disney leadership is letting a tremendous opportunity slip away.
Let’s focus on a single passage from the company’s press release for this quarter and consider what Disney’s 10Q filing tells us about it:
"Higher operating income was due to growth at our domestic parks and resorts driven by increased guest spending at Walt Disney World Resort, higher attendance at Disneyland Resort and increased occupied room nights at both resorts. Higher guest spending was due to higher average ticket prices and food, beverage and merchandise spending. These increases were partially offset by higher costs which were driven by spending on MyMagic+ and labor and other cost inflation, partially offset by lower pension and postretirement medical costs."
As disclosed in the 10Q, domestic theme park attendance is up 3% but that number is artificially low as a result of Easter shifting to Q3 this year. As indicated in the press release, it appears most, perhaps even all, of the quarter’s gain is driven by DLR. WDW attendance essentially is flat.
Flat attendance at any Orlando theme park is pretty good performance right now, especially with the loss of Easter week.
Historically, theme park attendance tends to decline before the unveiling of a major addition. Park goers tend to defer their visits, waiting for the big opening.
Although it’s debatable whether Seven Dwarfs Mine Train (SDMT) qualifies as a truly major addition, it is WDW’s best addition since Expedition Everest in 2006. That’s 8 years; practically a lifetime between rides when it comes to amusement parks. For Disneyphiles, SDMT represents the best thing in years.
There should be no debate that Diagon Alley is a huge addition in Orlando.
With Diagon Alley and SDMT rolling out this summer, it’s likely that large numbers delayed their Orlando vacations this year. Even with the addition of Diagon Alley, Universal remains a 2 or 3 day vacation for most, giving WDW the opportunity to draw these guests into their resort for 3 or 4 days. This summer, Diagon Alley will increase attendance at both Uni and WDW.
All things considered, flat attendance at WDW right before the opening of Diagon Alley and SDMT is pretty good performance. WDW remains as popular as ever.
Another number from the 10Q to consider is Per Capita Guest Spending (PCGS). This represents the amount spent per person at the theme parks. This is up only 4% 2Q2013 vs 2Q2014.
For corporate Disney, this is bad, really bad. In recent quarters, 8% has been the norm. WDW has raised ticket prices an average of 12% over the last 12 months. Food, beverage, and merchandise prices are up considerably too.
A 4% PCGS increase along with much higher prices suggest WDW theme park prices are reaching a breaking point. Rather than simply pay Disney’s higher prices, guests are reducing spending. That means fewer meals; fewer drinks; fewer t-shirts. All these are high margin items. This adversely impacts profitability. Disney simply cannot keep charging more for the same old same old. Their paying customers are starting to revolt.
Taken together, the attendance and PCGS numbers suggest that guests still love WDW but just can’t stomach the prices anymore.
Disney needs to slow down theme park price increases and look for revenue elsewhere.
Guess what? They have it at the hotels if they are not afraid to use it.
What do I mean?
Unlike the theme park numbers, which are roughly split 2-to-1 between WDW vs. DLR, the 10Q hotel numbers are nearly 90% of what’s happening at WDW. Overwhelmingly, these numbers represent what’s happening in Orlando.
And this quarter’s hotel numbers are good.
Really good.
Both for Disney and for consumers.
MyMagic+ was rolled out to onsite guests in October and was announced before then, just in time to influence guest hotel choices for the just-reported quarter.
Guests responded tremendously. Whether frightened at the prospect of being treated like second-class citizens and being forced to stand in those sometimes ungodly FastPass+ kiosk lines or simply being attracted by the idea of preselecting 3 attractions before arriving, guests decided to stay onsite.
Occupancy skyrocketed from 80% to 86% year-over-year, one of the largest jumps in the history of WDW. Available Room Nights remained flat, suggesting this surge in occupancy was real.
This is not some correction easily attributable to external factors such as the economy or cheap travel. The improved occupancy represents a significant rethinking by WDW guests on the way they selected their hotels.
Remember, pre-selection of FastPass+ wasn’t made available to offsite guests until April, after the end of the quarter. Throughout the entire second quarter, onsite guests had a distinct advantage over offsite guests. The second quarter results show a customer base ready to respond to this advantage by purchasing more high-margin hotel stays.
Also helping this surge were flat hotel rates.
Per Room Guest Spending (PRGS) represents the amount spent per occupied room night at the hotels, including “guest spending on food, beverage and merchandise at the hotels”. PRGS was up only 2.6%. Think about that for a moment. Taking into account food, beverage and merchandise price increases at the hotels and actual room rates were flat.
Taken together, MyMagic+ along with flat hotel rates helped fuel a surge in onsite hotel stays.
Did I mention that WDW’s hotels are obscenely profitable?
Once a hotel reaches a certain occupancy rate, the incremental cost of filling extra rooms is minimal. At Disney’s occupancy rates, the incremental cost of filling extra rooms is perhaps $20 or $30/night. Yet PRGS was $275/night. That’s a lot of profit.
WDW has nearly 24,000 hotel rooms. Until the most recent quarter, over 5,000 of these were going empty most nights. $275 X 5,000 X 365 nights per year equals, well, it equals a lot of money every year.
Whether you like it or not, MyMagic+ could work as a tool to increase the number of onsite hotel stays. MyMagic+ could be used to fill those empty rooms, even justify the construction of additional rooms.
With Disney’s incredible margins, increased hotel stays are WDW’s next chance to cash in big.
Yet WDW management is letting this opportunity slip away.
Offsite guests now are able to make their FastPass+ selections 30 days in advance, considerably reducing the appeal of onsite stays. Piling on top of that, MagicBands now are for sale for a measly $12.95. Rather than representing a badge of distinction for onsite guests, MagicBands can be purchased for about the same price as those cheap metal pins Disney sells by the tens-of-millions.
Offsite and local guests won’t like the suggestion but, if kept as an exclusive onsite perk, MyMagic+ was a potential gold mine or, in the spirit of SDMT, a potential diamond mine.
Fortunately for offsite and local guests, Disney management was afraid to leverage MyMagic+ to its full potential.
It just goes to show that WDW continues to be mismanaged, both creatively and financially.
WDW desperately needs strong leadership with vision.