I don't know if I'd call MyMagic+ the worst thing to happen at WDW in a long time. Opinions seem to be decidedly mixed. There are many who genuinely are happy with it. It seems like a natural for those who already enjoy planning their ADRs 180 days out.
The bigger question is whether MyMagic+ has been a financial success.
So far, the answer is ‘no’.
To appreciate MyMagic+’s tepid performance, it’s helpful to compare the current fiscal year’s results with baseline results from previous years. Let’s look at Parks & Resorts (P&R) domestic results since 2011:
Revenue Annual Growth
- 2011-2013 average: 10.7%
- 2014: 8.2%
Per Capita Guest Spending (PCGS) Annual Growth
- 2011-2013 average: 7.7%
- 2014: 7.0%
Per Room Guest Spending (PRGS) Annual Growth
- 2010-2013 average: 6.0%
- 2014: 4.9%
Rather than improve performance, growth has slowed in MyMagic+’s first year of use.
It’s doubtful that this slowing is a result of MyMagic+. Rather, it’s likely the result of other business decisions made in the years leading up to MyMagic+.
From 2011 to 2013, Disney aggressively increased prices at the theme parks, much faster than consumer income. As a result, theme park spending slowed in 2014 even as Disney unveiled MyMagic+, Seven Dwarfs Mine Train (SDMT), and
Frozen-themed offerings. People simply could not afford to pay Disney’s higher prices, no matter what Disney offered.
Demand was there. Both WDW and Universal saw record crowds this summer while Orlando area hotels had a bumper year in a slowly improving economy. SDMT, Frozen, and Diagon Alley were popular draws.
However, MyMagic+ (which was intended to increase per person spending) was largely ineffective because WDW’s customer base could not keep pace with Disney’s price increases.
A lot of this is timing. If corporate Disney had deferred the 2011-2013 price increases to coincide with the launch of MyMagic+, MyMagic+ could have been declared a major success. Instead, Disney pretty much guaranteed MyMagic+’s sagging performance through its earlier decisions.
MyMagic+ wasn’t a bad idea; however, it was poorly executed. MyMagic+ was an incredibly complex project, well outside of Disney’s comfort zone, and Disney leadership had a difficult time managing it. Its costs grossly overran budget, while the system continues to experience numerous technical glitches.
Disney executives jumped on the MyMagic+ bandwagon in part because they lacked the background necessary to fully understand its many intricate parts.
MyMagic+ appealed to Disney executives because of how its costs were structured. Unlike traditional brick-and-mortar attractions, MyMagic+’s costs were buried in other P&R expenses; over $1 billion in operating expense (opex) plus another $500 million in selling, general & administrative expense (SG&A). A relatively modest $400 million was spent as capital expenditures (capex). This appealed to executives responsible for green-lighting MyMagic+ since their compensation packages were (and still are) designed to discourage capex investments.
MyMagic+ should have been used to draw Guests onsite. Magic Bands should have remained an exclusive onsite-only perk while numbers from the one quarter when MyMagic+ was an onsite only benefit suggest that it significantly increased hotel occupancy.
Under the right circumstances, MyMagic+ could have been a rousing success. However, between the 2011-2013 price increases, the inability to control costs or manage its complexities, and the decision to minimize onsite vs. offsite benefits, MyMagic+ has proven to be an expense gimmick with disappointing financial returns.
cheaper and no waiting in lines.
After all, for some reason, it tastes exactly the same. 
