In October 2013, VGF added 2.5M DVC points representing 100 2-bedroom equivalent villas. (Compared to a total of 47M DVC points & 3100 rooms at WDW.) As of June 2014, 55% of VGF's points have been sold. As its current rate, VGF should sell out within 12 months. That's less than 2 years to sell 2.5M points.
IMHO, this sell rate represents the sustainable DVC market for the next several years.
Early in its history, DVC was targeted at stealing away business from offsite timeshares. OKW and BWV appealed to those looking to buy timeshares and who might not spend their lodging dollars at Disney. Both resorts opened with DVC rooms.
DVC began to cannibalize its own Deluxe Resort business with the opening of VWL in 2000. This expansion added timeshare rooms to an existing hotel. The market for those rooms overlapped the market for Deluxe Resort rooms. However, the numbers were small (136 rooms) so its effect wasn't noticeable.
The problem slightly worsened with the opening of BCV in 2002. Y&BC was (and still is) a popular resort. Expanding DVC there began to pull away guests from other popular Deluxe Resorts. Again though, the numbers were small (208 rooms).
Where DVC jumped the shark was with the rapid expansion of SSR (2004), AKV (2007), and BLT (2009). Combined, these 3 resorts more than doubled the number DVC rooms. Rather than remaining exclusive (in 2003, DVC represented only 5% of total WDW room inventory), DVC was turned into timeshares for the masses.
With the rapid expansion of these 3 resorts, DVC kiosks began to pop up everywhere, targeting all sorts of guests, often those who already were spending big bucks to stay onsite.
It was after the opening of AKV that WDW's hotels occupancy began its steady decline, a decline that continued as Disney raised hotel rack rates in an effort to justify the 'cost savings' of DVC. (The same way that we've seen the price of food at WDW increase in order to justify the price of DDP.)
WDW now has over 3100 2-bedroom equivalents, representing 9300 physical rooms tied up in DVC. (Recall that prior to the opening of Cabana Bay, Universal had a
total of 2400 onsite rooms.) These 9300 rooms represent a tremendous loss of potential revenue to WDW, as DVC members pay in annual dues only a fraction of what cash guests pay for equivalent hotel rooms.
Disney has seen the adverse effect of DVC, both in terms of much lower occupancy rates at the Deluxe Resorts as well as in the need to offer 30-40% discounts for the majority of the year. (It wasn't that long ago when Disney never offered discounts.)
Going forward, the damage is done. Disney is losing potential hotel revenue because of DVC.
Recognizing that even 'long-term' strategic planners rarely look beyond the next 3-4 years, converting (mostly empty) hotel rooms to DVC is exactly the right way to recapture some of that lost potential revenue. It's a matter of, "If you can't beat them, join them."
However, it's thoroughly depressing because it means that WDW is simply continuing its current trend of optimizing business rather than taking Universal's current approach to growing business. In other words, conversion of hotel to DVC is consistent with a company that's focused on steps such price increases, quality cuts, delayed investments, etc.
There is nothing in this move to signal anything besides the continued slow downward spiral that we've seen at WDW for the last 15 years or so.