The automated system was installed as a result of the accident. The pilots supervise and initiate movement but it is all now computer controlled. A lot of the things related to movement that people say are due to poor upkeep are not, they’re the automated system driving the train.
Why not just read the accident report?
I believe that death was an operator in a pilot's booth. Guests are no longer allowed in pilot's areas to protect them, as the front and backs of the train are the most vulnerable part if there is a collision. (The death was related to a collision. From memory, in or near a station, though that last part could be wrong.). Anyway, if you're a guest, with this, you have a 0% chance of being killed to date.
But how about falling out an open door/window or have a part drop on you? Not a zero chance
…I was thinking of pelican strikes?
This is what is concerning, and what has been eluded to over and over in this thread. There are no less than 6 areas of specialty for reviewing & inspecting standard train operation per the FRA.
Inspections don't prevent human error, which was the cause of the fatal monorail accident.
But inspections do review procedures- which if different could have avoided the human mistakes and/or had other checks in place that could have caught the first error before the trains collided
I run my own business managing employees in 12 states.
The thing is the state should have stepped in with inspections after the door fell off it they thought it was necessary.
In the old monorails back in the 70s "door unsafe" was rather common - either not closed enough (you had the slam the darn things) or they'd actually pop open. It was such a concern that the beams by the Contemporary have large support platforms to catch doors ripped off going into the Contemporary (I drove them, so I cannot begin to tell you the number of times I got a door unsafe and told to crawl into the C).
It wasn't pilot error. During shutdown, monorails from EPCOT loop have to be shunted over to the MK loop. During this procedure the emergency stop system has to be overridden or the monorail will auto stop preventing the transfer. The EPCOT train needs to back through the TTC station. During this operation a supervisor is supposed to be onsite visually assuring the beam is switched. It was not and the supervisor was over at Denny's. As train #1 was backing through the station train #2 was approaching. While train #2 could see the approaching train, the operator in train #1 could not.
Yes the manager that was eating at Denny's off property and directing the monorails while on lunch break was the icing on the cake. Better that Disney settled with the family instead of a civil trial.
Given the time of the collision was there anyone on the platform? I forget from when I read the report
So WDW was operating the monorail in violation of safety protocols?
When procedures aren't followed, it doesn't matter.
They were being followed that night. They were insufficient to prevent one mistake (the switch operator in the barn) from leading to a fatality.
No - they had a operator error in the barn and the operating procedures were too lax to catch it or see the symptoms before the collision happened.
Guests were still in the system… so the station would have been manned
