A few problems with your analysis.
1) Consumers aren't showing any resistance to the pricing, either on the DVC side or on the regular room night side.
Consumers
are showing resistance to pricing, which I why I posted this earlier on the thread:
I believe this is part of a conscious pricing strategy by Disney. Disney has shifted away from mega DVC Resorts (the relatively recent SSR, AKV, BLT, and Aulani are 4 of Disney's 5 largest DVC resorts) to smaller, higher priced additions at existing Deluxe Resorts.
Disney would rather sell fewer points at higher prices, but this also means potential timeshare buyers are being priced out of the market. There is nothing inherently good or evil about this. This is simply how Disney is choosing to price this luxury item.
Disney was having similar problems filling its hotel rooms for a few years, but the number of occupied rooms has been
outstanding for the first 2 fiscal quarters of 2015.
So far, this high hotel occupancy rate has not translated into higher DVC sales. Again, this seems to be part of an intentional strategy on Disney's part. Disney wants fewer DVC points sold but at higher prices.
2) If and when consumers do show resistance, it won't be all at once. Volumes will slowly decrease rather than all of a sudden "crash." Further, Disney is not powerless in this regard. When they encounter resistance, they have more than enough flexibility to discount down or slow the rate of YOY increase.
See above.
3) The real estate bubble is a poor analogy because the real estate bubble was driven by debt. Disney is nothing like your neighborhood real estate developer in that they're leveraged 100% and unable to hold assets without a cash injection in the event of a market downturn. If the bottom fell out of the economy tomorrow such that Disney couldn't sell DVC units at anything resembling a reasonable return, they have more than enough liquidity to hold them until a recovery while offering selective discounting.
Overwhelmingly, the DVC market is debt driven. Most buyers take out high interest rate loans to make their DVC purchases. For example, a week in a PVB Standard View Studio this summer requires 169 points. At today's price of $165/point and with closing costs, a PVB buyer needs to cough up over $28K for the initial purchase, plus another $1K in annual Maintenance Fees. Most DVC buyers take out loans to make this purchase.
During the height of the real estate bubble, Disney was foreclosing on record numbers of DVC members and offering discounts to those still purchasing direct. Meanwhile, resale prices were at record lows and DVC memberships could be acquired for less than 50 cents on the dollar.
For some perspective, VGF currently is selling for approximately $145/point on the resale market, compared to its direct price of $165/point. Considering resale's closing costs are higher, resales currently are selling for less than a 10% discount, a discount more typical in the mid-2000s before the most recent real estate bubble.
@hpyhnt 1000 wrote:
And that right there sums up the entire problem with WDW's hotels and DVC. They want to raise the cost of DVC points to lock in more money from people. But to do that, you also need to raise hotel prices so that DVC still appears to have "value." What results is an ever upward climb of prices until it all crashes because the consumer finally says, "No, this is insane. I'm done."
At this point, it is clear that Disney has more less decided that it is willing to sacrifice potential revenue from daily hotel stays in favor of the chance at getting people to buy into DVC at exorbitant prices. But in the process, all they are doing is creating a Mouse version of the real estate bubble, not to mention diminishing the quality and amenities of WDW resorts as a whole.
Like you, I don't see Disney "creating a Mouse version of the real estate bubble." I cannot envision a scenario where Disney would be forced to discount direct DVC prices by more than 10% or 20% and, as I believe you suggest, Disney has the financial resources to weather a downturn in the DVC market, essentially carrying the Maintenance fees of excess DVC points until better economic times.
However, Disney is creating a revenue stream bubble. Because of the way a DVC sale is structured, each unit sold represents 1 year of phenomenal revenue followed by 49 years of subpar revenue for a Deluxe Resort accommodation.
Disney needs to keep selling DVC units in order to keep this revenue bubble from collapsing but, as indicated by the declining number of DVC points sold per annum, Disney is facing an uphill battle as it continues to raise direct sale prices even as the total number of DVC points grows.
4) There's zero risk to future "daily hotel stays" because, as I've already pointed out, Disney has flexibility. Rack rate means nothing to the hotel guest because rack rate isn't what they actually pay. As you alluded to, rack rate is a tool used to sell timeshares and create the illusion of value when they're discounted. It's never a target that Disney actually expects to get.
You are giving the consumer too much credit. You and I understand WDW's pricing better than 99.9% of WDW's hotel Guests. Plenty of WDW Guests pay rack rates.
Perhaps more importantly, whether a DVC members uses their points or rents them out on the secondary market, each DVC unit sold represents one less room at Disney's hotel rates. Even with a 30% discount, Disney's Deluxe Resorts are really expensive compared to the rest of the Orlando market, but paying DVC's "49 year rate" is well below market rate for most offsite hotels, representing a subpar revenue stream for Disney.
On the plus side, each hotel room converted to DVC also means one less room that Disney has to fill via a "room only" or "free dining" discount. As the number of Deluxe Resort rooms decline, presumably Disney will need to offer fewer discounts to fill the remaining Deluxe Resort rooms, meaning RevPAR will approach rack rate.
With hotel occupancy currently approaching 90%, Disney's decision to convert hotel rooms to DVC looks really dumb. Long term, it will be interesting to watch whether 2015's 89% or 2013's 79% is more representative. With over 5,000 Deluxe Resort rooms and a growing number of nearby deluxe accommodations (e.g. the Waldorf Astoria and the Fours Seasons), I suspect Disney is making the right move.
ETA: 5) The "diminishing quality of amenities at DVC resorts" argument has been debunked by others more articulate than I am so I'm not even going to bother. In fact, a portion of maintenance fees paid by DVC members is used on upkeep for common areas that are shared with the "regular" hotel at a given resort. In that way, DVC members are actually subsidizing a portion of the maintenance of lobbies, pools, and restaurants on behalf of the regular guests.
This is a subjective topic with both sides dug in; neither side is winning any converts.