That's a great question. To answer it, you need to consider what happened during Iger's tenure before the NextGen initiative was launched. Iger joined Disney in 1996 when Disney took over ABC. Iger had absolutely no theme park experience and his opinion of the business has been formed by what has happened since then.
In 1998, Disney opened the very expensive DAK. Expectations were high yet financial results did not match those expectations. DCA opened in 2001 and had similar disappointing results. At that point, adding theme parks to existing facilities very much fell out of vogue. However, there still was a strong view under Eisner that "something" needed to be done to keep guests coming so Disney spent several hundred million to build attractions (e.g. Mission Space, Soarin', Expedition Everest, Toy Story Mania, etc.). With the exception of Expedition Everest, none had any appreciable affect on attendance and even EE didn't help revenue; guests simply spent more time in DAK and less time at WDW's other parks. (WDW has a similar problem today with the New Fantasyland.) Corporately, new theme parks and new attractions represented old-school thinking. Iger, a Blue Ocean Strategy convert, wanted an innovative business solution.
What was a rousing financial success was Disney's Magical Express (DME). Launched in 2005, corporate Disney discovered that offering "free" bus service boosted revenue on a self-sustaining budget (it's built into the price of the resorts). These captive guests spent more at WDW. Maybe, just maybe, the conventional wisdom went, the key to success was not traditional brick-and-motor investments but innovative business gimmicks.
Data at the time suggested Orlando tourism would be relatively flat for the foreseeable future. Thus, to grow business, Disney was going to have to figure out a way to get their deep-pocketed onsite guests to remaining within the WDW bubble. Those were the ones spending the big dollars per day. Those were the high rollers corporate Disney wanted to chase.
New theme parks didn't boost WDW tourism, at least not enough to justify the cost. New attractions didn't have much effect financially. Yet something as simple as DME worked tremendously well. (By the way, so did targeting South American markets. It's these markets that have been slowly replacing declining domestic attendance.) With total Orlando tourism projected to be flat and with WDW having lots deep-pocketed onsite guests spending their vacation money elsewhere, what could be done to boost revenue? Sure, prices could be raised (e.g. ticket prices up 25% in 3 years; food prices even more) but what else could be done? Higher prices only chased guests away. What else could Disney do to get their onsite guests to stay onsite?
Enter NextGen.
NextGen represented the innovative business thinking Iger so desperately wanted. NextGen was sold to corporate as a way to lengthen guest stays, reduce operating expense, and modernize WDWs antiquated systems. NextGen brought WDW into the 21st Century, something every Disney executive, who spends half their day with their heads buried in their smart phones, could appreciate.
DME got onsite guests to stay within the WDW bubble longer. The thinking was so would the FP+ aspect of what now was being called MyMagic+. After all, it was CFO Jay Rasulo who said to Wall Street, "So if we can get people to plan their vacation before they leave home, we know that we get more time with them. We get a bigger share of their wallet. So that's one thing for you guys to think about."
Giving guests lots of good FP+ selections each day does not lengthen their time in the WDW's theme parks. If anything, it shortens it. Seriously, if I have FP+ selections on the same day for Soarin', Test Track, and Mission Space (or Turtle Talk), exactly why do I need to visit Epcot a second day?
It's not an unreasonable line of thought. If FP+ saves guests 50 minutes on Mission Space, 100 minutes on Test Track, and 140 minutes on Soarin', guests can reasonably expect to do all of Epcot in a day. The only way to get them to stretch out their time at WDW is to
not offer all those FP+ selections for the same day. After all, being manipulated into to visiting Epcot on 2 days to get those additional time savings means guests can sleep in and still spend less time in line. Slowing down, sleeping in, and spending less time in line (and more time in WDW's restaurants and stores
) sure sounds like a much more enjoyable vacation, the thinking went. All they have to do is make their FP+ selections from home for 2 days at Epcot and they'll be guaranteed short waits for 6 attractions, not just 3, including all of Epcot's headliners.
Remember, this was the same group that turned down Harry Potter at WDW. This is the group that has seen their NextGen budget triple. To date, their theme park success has been based mostly on higher prices and good advertising in South America. Until the recent success of Carsland at DCA, this was the group that was essentially 0-fer at making smart theme park decisions. (Even Carsland was ramrodded through by Lasseter.)
At the time the decision was made to move forward with NextGen, it seemed like a viable plan. Don't forget that it was conceived before the success of WWOHP and Carsland, before results suggested that the winning formula was to add well-themed and immersive lands, which is why we'll get Avatar at DAK and Star Was at DHS.
In hindsight, NextGen is beginning to look like a poor decision. Grossly overbudget, it's becoming Disney's albatross. Preliminary results suggest that large numbers dislike the preplanning and it will do little to discourage trips to other Orlando destinations.
In 2014, WDW is going to experience an attendance bump but it won't be because of NextGen. It will be from Diagon Alley's spillover.
I'm
so looking forward to hearing corporate Disney's spin on the "success" of MyMagic+.