New Monorail Crash Details

[Skyway]

I figured this deserved its own post.

If this new Orlando Sentinel article is to be believed (and I think it is), it was the maintenance shop worker who screwed up by telling the manager that the track switch had been flipped, when in fact it had not.

Also, when the central coordinator suddenly had to go home sick, the manager WAS ALREADY AT PERKINS, which was allowed during his scheduled dinner break.

While waiting for the replacement for that sick coordinator to arrive, the manager did radio some instructions from Perkins (again, that doesn't sound like it was against any rule, especially considering the "emergency" nature of an employee suddenly going home sick at that very moment)

Here's the article:

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-d...tory?track=rss


So, let's see. People on these boards first blamed Austin for being young and causing the crash. Then they blamed Pink's driver. Then they blamed this manager for "negligently" going off-property on an unauthorized dinner break. None of which appears to be true.

The new person I feel sorry for is the coordinator who had to go home sick. Sounds like it must have been urgent. You know that person has to be feeling guilty for leaving, even though the illness may have been totally legitimate.

 

[board57796]

Yyyep.

Also refer to the quoted portion, and reply, of this post made 3 days after the incident:

http://forums.wdwmagic.com/showpost.php?p=3621866&postcount=1294

 

[GymLeaderPhil]

Working Link:
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-disney-monorail-crash-071509,0,5258965.story

 

[jmvd20]

So, let's see. People on these boards first blamed Austin for being young and causing the crash. Then they blamed Pink's driver. Then they blamed this manager for "negligently" going off-property on an unauthorized dinner break. None of which appears to be true.

Oh come on now, you are letting the factual information of the event get in the way of assigning blame here...

I can see someone coming here soon enough and posting that it is still the direct fault of the management culture at WDW - after all they should have had another coordinator on site as a paid "stand-by" just in case... or 2... or 3... after all that is how they "used" to do things...

 

[EPCOT Explorer]

Very interesting that the person was already there at the Denny's/Perkins/whatever. I will admit I thought it was his fault.


This is such a breakdown of procedure, I think... So many things went wrong that night.

 

[Buried20KLeague]

I actually wondered in one of my posts if the guy was already off site at dinner when command was passed to him. I guess this answers that.

I'm not sure how this absolves pink though. It still seems to me that visual indicators should have been throwing all KINDS of red flags at him.

To me, the only person this clears is the manager at dinner. By the sounds of it, he was within the "rules" and was doing as protocol would dictate.

 

[jmvd20]

One of the problems here is that it seems people want to blame one person, or one incident for the accident (any accident for that matter). In reality though there are almost always more than one wrong event or mistake that combine to culminate in an accident.

This situation is no different, many things transpired at the exact wrong times and led to an accident. As with most accidents this also occurred during a routine procedure where failures/mistakes/bad timing all combined to cause it.

 

[Studios Fan]

Yeah it seems like a multitude of things went wrong.

 

[board57796]

Yeah it seems like a multitude of things went wrong.

Indeed. Like I said in the main accident thread, when a Pilot hears "clear" from Central, that is as good as gold as the pilot is concerned. When Central hears shop say the switches were moved, that is as good as gold as far as Central is concerned. Its a routine that has been practiced night after night for years, and for some reason, on that night, the switch wasn't moved. Central had no reason to doubt shop, just as Pink had [relatively] no reason to doubt Central. Someone in that thread mentioned that, in law enforcement, you all rely on each other to give you accurate information. For 38 years, that information was generally accurate, and had never resulted in an accident.

Unfortunately for the manager, the public already has their opinion formed, because it was reported he was at Denny's during the accident. Did they care to ask whether it was his break time? No, because it "sounded bad" and I know how the media likes to report things that sound shocking.

 

[KeeKee]

I remember riding in the cab with the pilot about a year ago when he was talking about having to anticipate a stop by "2 or 3 seconds" because of the the lag time in the responsiveness of the train. If the pink pilot makes it all the way into the station before seeing the control tower on the wrong side, he wouldn't have had enough time to stop his train before hitting purple, right? Based on that, doesn't all come down to the track not being switched properly? Not sure if pink's pilot could have done anything if he had realized the error because of the lag time in stopping the train. Is this correct?

 

[hardcard]

Austin = Cleared
Pink Driver = Cleared
Monorail Central = Cleared
System = Cleared
Maintenance Worker = You got some splainin' to do..



Thats the summary of where the investigation lies.

 

[nolatron]

Austin = Cleared
Pink Driver = Cleared
Monorail Central = Cleared
System = Cleared
Maintenance Worker = You got some splainin' to do..

Thats the summary of where the investigation lies.

I'm still interested to hear from the Pink Driver as to why he didn't notice he was on the wrong track as soon as he passed the switch.

According to google earth, from the EPCOT Spur switch to the TTC is approximately 1,250' (1/4 of a mile) on the mainline. A Monorail is about 200' long.

So as his cab passed the switch, the rear of the monorail was about still 1,000' from the TTC. At 15mph it's roughly a 45 second trip to the TTC after he cleared the switch.

I'm interested to learn why he didn't notice the spur was still on his left side and not the mainline on the right primarily as soon he crossed the switch and then during the 45 second trip to the TTC. Was it too dark? Was a cab light on (which could practically kill any view outside of the window)? Was he doing something else in the cab?

 

[PhotoDave219]

Austin = Cleared
Pink Driver = Cleared
Monorail Central = Cleared
System = Cleared
Maintenance Worker = You got some splainin' to do..



Thats the summary of where the investigation lies.

Its not that simple.

Why are we driving trains in reverse through track switches?

Why are track switches not visually confirmed that they have switched?

Why does something as common as a track switch require a MAPO override? (Every day for 38 years)

How could you not notice you were on the wrong track for a minute in reverse?

How could you not notice you didn't go through the switch?

How come the station crew didn't notice the train was on the wrong track?

It wasn't just one person's fault. Don't try and make it that simple.

 

[PhotoDave219]

I'm still interested to hear from the Pink Driver as to why he didn't notice he was on the wrong track as soon as he passed the switch.

According to google earth, from the EPCOT Spur switch to the TTC is approximately 1,250' (1/4 of a mile) on the mainline. A Monorail is about 200' long.

So as his cab passed the switch, the rear of the monorail was about still 1,000' from the TTC. At 15mph it's roughly a 45 second trip to the TTC after he cleared the switch.

I'm interested to learn why he didn't notice the spur was still on his left side and not the mainline on the right primarily as soon he crossed the switch and then during the 45 second trip to the TTC. Was it too dark? Was a cab light on (which could practically kill any view outside of the window)? Was he doing something else in the cab?

I rode the Epcot loop on Sunday. That's a long time to go from the station to the switch while going forward, lettalone in Reverse in override.

 

[s8film40]

A good article with some inside perspective:http://www.mouseplanet.com/8909/Carelessness_Kills_Monorail_drivers_lay_blame_for_fatal_crash_on_sloppiness_and_shortcuts

 

[theadmiral459]

I'm still interested to hear from the Pink Driver as to why he didn't notice he was on the wrong track as soon as he passed the switch.

According to google earth, from the EPCOT Spur switch to the TTC is approximately 1,250' (1/4 of a mile) on the mainline. A Monorail is about 200' long.

So as his cab passed the switch, the rear of the monorail was about still 1,000' from the TTC. At 15mph it's roughly a 45 second trip to the TTC after he cleared the switch.

I'm interested to learn why he didn't notice the spur was still on his left side and not the mainline on the right primarily as soon he crossed the switch and then during the 45 second trip to the TTC. Was it too dark? Was a cab light on (which could practically kill any view outside of the window)? Was he doing something else in the cab?

This was also mentioned in the Big thread also.

 

[joel_maxwell]

Its not that simple.

Why are we driving trains in reverse through track switches?

Why are track switches not visually confirmed that they have switched?

Why does something as common as a track switch require a MAPO override? (Every day for 38 years)

How could you not notice you were on the wrong track for a minute in reverse?

How could you not notice you didn't go through the switch?

How come the station crew didn't notice the train was on the wrong track?

It wasn't just one person's fault. Don't try and make it that simple.

you know, I was wondering the same thing. Why wouldnt you change cabs so you could see where you were going. I always though that would be a "best practice" type thing.

Good questions that need attention.

 

[s8film40]

you know, I was wondering the same thing. Why wouldnt you change cabs so you could see where you were going. I always though that would be a "best practice" type thing.

Good questions that need attention.

The normal switching procedure requires the train to travel out past the switch and then change directions and go back through the switch. Whether the driver switches cabs before or after the switch they are still traveling in reverse part of the way.

 

[JWG]

The normal switching procedure requires the train to travel out past the switch and then change directions and go back through the switch. Whether the driver switches cabs before or after the switch they are still traveling in reverse part of the way.

Long-term Fix: Next generatoin of train must allow for the driver to easily switch cabs out on the beam (meaning: while on the train and not having to exit to the platform). Pull out of the stations past the switch. Switch ends and pull forward through the switch.

This accomplishes two things:
1) No monorail in reverse
2) Reduced delays for track swtiching by allowing the current process less the reversing.

It's not like these are subway trains extending for 1/4 of a mile and it's a long walk from end to end. Just make it possible to do so without leaving the train.

 

[Master Yoda]

Long-term Fix: Next generatoin of train must allow for the driver to easily switch cabs out on the beam (meaning: while on the train and not having to exit to the platform). Pull out of the stations past the switch. Switch ends and pull forward through the switch.

This accomplishes two things:
1) No monorail in reverse
2) Reduced delays for track swtiching by allowing the current process less the reversing.

It's not like these are subway trains extending for 1/4 of a mile and it's a long walk from end to end. Just make it possible to do so without leaving the train.

Or just install back up cameras with proximity detectors for an added measure of safety.