Sirwalterraleigh
Premium Member
Not if there's a Hugh Jackman M&G!
That’s an “exclusive ticketed event”
Not if there's a Hugh Jackman M&G!
You guys should have checked my workI've been studying the numbers of what Disney would look like if they put out a $90 billion bid, assuming 50/50 cash/stock, and compared that to the impact of a $90 billion all-cash bid from Comcast.
Disney would increase their debt from their current bid of $74.79 billion to $84.14 billion. This would increase their leverage from 3.1x to 3.5x assuming 39% stake in Sky. (I didn't run the numbers including Sky simply because I think they'll give it up/sell it if they have to.)
This is something Disney would be comfortable with.
Disney would also have to issue about 96 million more shares at the midpoint of the existing collar for a total of 439 million new shares, this compares to initial and current bids of 515 million and 343 million shares, respectively. The midpoint is currently situated at roughly $104/share, about $2 dollars less than their current share price. This would mean that Fox shareholders would hold roughly 23% of the pro forma company. This is more than the current bid of 19%, but less than the initial bid where they would hold 25%. Disney should also be comfortable here.
Raising Comcast's bid to $90 billion all-cash would increase their debt from $170 billion to $195 billion, assuming there is no increase in their Sky bid, which there is likely to be, but I didn't include it for the sake of comparison. This would increase their leverage from 4.25x to 4.88x, in other words it would take them 5.36 years to pay down their debt to reasonable levels versus the 4.1 years of their current bid, assuming a decrease of half a turn of leverage per year.
With this model, Disney would be able to return to attractive leverage 2.76 years before Comcast. I should also note that going this high for Comcast would almost certainly devastate their credit rating.
Have fun picking this apart!
The smartest thing Rich Greenfield has ever said was it’s better, in the long run, for new entrants to learn the business and create their own content than buying an existing company.Those companies are not interested in buying big studios. Many have already said so. It just doesn't make sense for them for a whole host of reasons.
Yep, completely agree with that. But he doesn't understand that Disney can't simply invest in content and create a Netflix competitor because other Hollywood studios would be unwilling to license their content to a Disneyflix. Buying Fox gives them a significant amount of adult IP, the lack of which would be a significant hurdle to the success of a true Netflix competitor.The smartest thing Rich Greenfield has ever said was it’s better, in the long run, for new entrants to learn the business and create their own content than buying an existing company.
You know it would be “Hugh Jackman” like Star Lord at Epcot this summer is “Chris Pratt”.Not if there's a Hugh Jackman M&G!
I believe marni1971 also hinted at this in another thread. Was there really anyone who thought this Fox deal wouldn't negatively impact the parks? Especially WDW, always being Disney's favorite victim to abuse and suck dry whenever they want extra money for something. Even Shanghai Disneyland going over budget had a noticeable effect on WDW for a while, and the Fox deal utterly dwarfs Shanghai Disneyland's costs.My understanding is that there are discussions of fat that would be trimmed specifically for this.
You know it would be “Hugh Jackman” like Star Lord at Epcot this summer is “Chris Pratt”.
No one is saying Disney would HAVE to cut budgets at the parks, nor should they. But they will anyways, that's how they conduct business. And we've gotten word from two trustworthy people (marni1971 and MansionButler84) that cuts are already being prepared proactively in response to the Fox deal likely going through.I don't see it, even with the divested properties taken out of the figures ..there's sufficient income to both service all the debt and maintain existing facilities. More so than what would happen to Universal if they increased their debt to 174 billion
Btw, in terms of sources on this battle, Comcast obviously has CNBC's ear. David Faber in particular seems to have strong sources in the Comcast and Disney camps. Personally, I think Disney is feeding Bloomberg. With the Murdochs clearly giving the WSJ the rundown.
If you notice a change in direction soon from CNBC with their hosts moving to a "Comcast doesn't need Fox" agenda, you know they got some "guidance" from Philly.
No one is saying Disney would HAVE to cut budgets at the parks, nor should they. But they will anyways, that's how they conduct business. And we've gotten word from two trustworthy people (marni1971 and MansionButler84) that cuts are already being prepared proactively in response to the Fox deal likely going through.
Disney in recent history hasn't even required a good financial reason to slash park budgets. They've made cuts to quality without even requiring a major expenditure to compensate for elsewhere. Shanghai Disneyland going over budget caused them to make a lot of budget cuts at WDW. And again Shanghai's struggles were nowhere near the expense this Fox deal will cost them, so you can safely bet the parks will suffer over this.
Apart from the constant cost cutting, I actually like Chapek. Long term I think he will be stuck of Parks and Merchandise and be one of those that never gets the top job.
Maybe Chapek will go on a spending spree if he does get the top job lol
Also, when this Fox deal goes through, have Disney said for certain that the Fox brand is staying?
The 21CF board discussed in detail the conclusion of 21CF management and Cleary that, while a potential Disney transaction was likely to receive required regulatory approvals and ultimately be consummated, a strategic transaction with Comcast continued to carry higher regulatory risk leading to the possibility of significant delay in the receipt of merger consideration as well as the risk of an inability to consummate the transactions. Key considerations driving this conclusion with respect to Disney included (1) Disney’s mix of businesses, (2) the progress made in the ongoing DOJ approval process under the original combination merger agreement, (3) the progress that had been made by 21CF and Disney in working toward other regulatory submissions under the original combination merger agreement and (4) the improved level of regulatory efforts to which Disney had committed in its current proposal as compared to the likely level and nature of risk its proposed transaction posed. With respect to Comcast, the 21CF board considered the relatively higher regulatory risk – in terms of both delay and closing risk – arising from (1) the DOJ’s apparent sensitivity to the potential anticompetitive effects of vertical integration and rejection of behavioral remedies before and after the litigation with respect to the AT&T / Time Warner transaction, which the court’s opinion by its terms did not reject as a matter of law but concluded had not been supported by sufficient evidence; (2) Comcast’s market share in important designated market areas and its associated strength arising from its broadband business; (3) Comcast’s previous acquisition of one of the leading content companies; (4) 21CF’s own prior regulatory submissions on related issues in the context of both Comcast’s proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable Inc. as well as the AT&T / Time Warner transaction; (5) the upcoming expiration of the 2011 consent decree with respect to Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal as well as the FCC’s abandonment of net neutrality; (6) the prospect of Comcast acquiring a controlling position in Hulu, which competes with Comcast’s core business, particularly given that the DOJ placed conditions on Comcast’s ownership of even a minority position in Hulu, LLC in the now-expiring 2011 consent decree; (7) Comcast’s ownership of several regional sports networks and competition with 21CF’s regional sports networks for acquisition of local sports rights; and (8) Comcast’s proposed contractual allocation of regulatory risk, which merely matched the regulatory efforts and reverse termination fee provisions in the original combination merger agreement and did not offer enhanced protections to address the higher regulatory risk posed by a transaction with Comcast.
The new proxy has been filed with the SEC. I'm digging through it now.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1744489/000119312518201596/d770960ds4.htm
Edits: Page 129 gets into new developments.
From page 133, another nail in the Comcast coffin:
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