News The Walt Disney Company Board of Directors Extends Robert A. Iger’s Contract as CEO Through 2026

UNCgolf

Well-Known Member
Bruce was CCO of Imagineering from 2007-2016, which I consider to be one of the greatest eras for WDI. He’s now back at WDI as President and CCO.

He’s definitely not a CEO contender.

Wow, really?

While obviously it's all subjective, I think that's one of the weakest periods of WDI, at least in terms of WDW. Not much happened and the things that did open in that time frame are generally among the weaker attractions in their respective parks, with the exception of Pandora (which didn't open until 2017 but was obviously designed and under construction before then).

That said, I don't think that was Bruce Vaughn's fault.
 

Stripes

Premium Member
Wow, really?

While obviously it's all subjective, I think that's one of the weakest periods of WDI, at least in terms of WDW. Not much happened and the things that did open in that time frame are generally among the weaker attractions in their respective parks, with the exception of Pandora (which didn't open until 2017 but was obviously designed and under construction before then).

That said, I don't think that was Bruce Vaughn's fault.
I’m talking about global Disney projects. The creative quality of the expansions around the world during that time were top notch IMO, and that’s what Bruce was in charge of. Obviously Bruce didn’t have any control over the investment in WDW, but he did play a big role in the creation of Pandora and New Fantasyland.

But around the world, you have DCA 2.0, Cars Land, Mystic Manor, Grizzly Gulch, Shanghai Disneyland, Monsters Inc. Ride and Go Seek in Tokyo…
 

BrianLo

Well-Known Member
Wow, really?

While obviously it's all subjective, I think that's one of the weakest periods of WDI, at least in terms of WDW. Not much happened and the things that did open in that time frame are generally among the weaker attractions in their respective parks, with the exception of Pandora (which didn't open until 2017 but was obviously designed and under construction before then).

That said, I don't think that was Bruce Vaughn's fault.

I’d have to think on it, but if we broaden it beyond WDW, which you kind of have to if truly evaluating WDI, it lops off all the horrendous Eisner early 2000 maneuvers. Also excludes Epcot. It Includes the DCA 2.0 redo, Hong Kong’s makeover, Disneyland 60th, Shanghai Disney up through Pandora.

I think the criticism is more one of spending (both by WDI, but more so Iger) than quality out of WDI during his tenure. Particularly if we just reflect on Radiator Springs Racers, Mystic Manor, Flight of Passage and Shanghai Pirates. That’s a very strong 10 year run. There are of course many misses.
 

Comped

Well-Known Member
Eisner specifically demanded that Wells clearly be #2 as a condition of his joining Disney.
Though I can tell you from stories I've heard from people who worked with both of them, that it wasn't as much the case of that being as hard line as you might think, particularly in the period before Frank's death. Arguably the two had close to equal influence over many areas and major decisions (over both parks and features), at least as I've heard told.
 

BrianLo

Well-Known Member
None of Disneys financials have a brighter outlook.

Guidance and Outlook:

  • We are confident in the long-term prospects for the business and believe we are well positioned for growth.
  • Fiscal 2025:
    • High-single digit adjusted EPS(1) growth compared to fiscal 2024
    • Approximately $15 billion in cash provided by operations
    • Approximately $8 billion of capital expenditures
    • Target dividend growth that tracks our earnings growth
    • Targeting $3 billion in stock repurchases
    • Entertainment: Double digit percentage segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024, weighted to the first half of the year
      • Entertainment DTC operating income increase of approximately $875 million versus fiscal 2024, which includes a comparison to an adverse impact of our India DTC business of approximately $200 million on fiscal 2024 Entertainment DTC results
      • Modest decline in Q1 Disney+ Core subscribers versus Q4
      • Q1 Content Sales/Licensing and Other operating income relatively in-line with Q4
    • Sports: 13% segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024 on a reported basis. Adjusting for the impact of our India business on Sports’ fiscal 2024 results, operating income is expected to decrease approximately 10%
    • Experiences: 6% to 8% segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024, weighted to the second half of the year
      • Q1 operating income adversely impacted by approximately $130 million due to Hurricanes Helene and Milton and approximately $90 million due to Disney Cruise Line pre-launch costs
  • Fiscal 2026(2):
    • Double digit adjusted EPS(1) growth
    • Double digit growth in cash provided by operations
    • When comparing to our fiscal 2025 guide, we expect:
      • Entertainment: Double digit percentage segment operating income growth; 10% operating margin for our Entertainment SVOD DTC businesses (excluding our Hulu Live DMVPD service)(1)
      • Sports: Low single digit percentage segment operating income growth
      • Experiences: High single digit percentage segment operating income growth
  • Fiscal 2027:
    • Double digit adjusted EPS(1) growth
 

JoeCamel

Well-Known Member
Guidance and Outlook:

  • We are confident in the long-term prospects for the business and believe we are well positioned for growth.
  • Fiscal 2025:
    • High-single digit adjusted EPS(1) growth compared to fiscal 2024
    • Approximately $15 billion in cash provided by operations
    • Approximately $8 billion of capital expenditures
    • Target dividend growth that tracks our earnings growth
    • Targeting $3 billion in stock repurchases
    • Entertainment: Double digit percentage segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024, weighted to the first half of the year
      • Entertainment DTC operating income increase of approximately $875 million versus fiscal 2024, which includes a comparison to an adverse impact of our India DTC business of approximately $200 million on fiscal 2024 Entertainment DTC results
      • Modest decline in Q1 Disney+ Core subscribers versus Q4
      • Q1 Content Sales/Licensing and Other operating income relatively in-line with Q4
    • Sports: 13% segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024 on a reported basis. Adjusting for the impact of our India business on Sports’ fiscal 2024 results, operating income is expected to decrease approximately 10%
    • Experiences: 6% to 8% segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024, weighted to the second half of the year
      • Q1 operating income adversely impacted by approximately $130 million due to Hurricanes Helene and Milton and approximately $90 million due to Disney Cruise Line pre-launch costs
  • Fiscal 2026(2):
    • Double digit adjusted EPS(1) growth
    • Double digit growth in cash provided by operations
    • When comparing to our fiscal 2025 guide, we expect:
      • Entertainment: Double digit percentage segment operating income growth; 10% operating margin for our Entertainment SVOD DTC businesses (excluding our Hulu Live DMVPD service)(1)
      • Sports: Low single digit percentage segment operating income growth
      • Experiences: High single digit percentage segment operating income growth
  • Fiscal 2027:
    • Double digit adjusted EPS(1) growth
So if Bob only spends 8B next year how is he ever going to get to the bottom of that 60B pot? I wonder......
 

BrianLo

Well-Known Member
So if Bob only spends 8B next year how is he ever going to get to the bottom of that 60B pot? I wonder......

8B*10 is 80. I’m not sure I understand what you are trying to say?

They are looking to average 6B in capital spend annually for ten years.

Year one was 5.4B. Next year meaningfully accelerates past that guidance. Which is definitely in part because of the lumpiness of the cruise ship builds.
 

JoeCamel

Well-Known Member
8B*10 is 80. I’m not sure I understand what you are trying to say?

They are looking to average 6B in capital spend annually for ten years.

Year one was 5.4B. Next year meaningfully accelerates past that guidance. Which is definitely in part because of the lumpiness of the cruise ship builds.
But Bob will be gone......
 

BrianLo

Well-Known Member
But Bob will be gone......

Ok… but Bob is currently doing what he said he would. Yes, someone else can certainly do their best to dismantle it, but that’s conjecture.

There’s also now financial obligations to the state of Florida, the city of Anaheim, LegCO, Shendi and by far the largest commitment - cruise ship orders. It would be pretty hard for a successor to bring it much below 40 since Bob will have pre-spent and contractually obligated a large chunk of it by the end of his tenure.
 

Disney Analyst

Well-Known Member
I’d have to think on it, but if we broaden it beyond WDW, which you kind of have to if truly evaluating WDI, it lops off all the horrendous Eisner early 2000 maneuvers. Also excludes Epcot. It Includes the DCA 2.0 redo, Hong Kong’s makeover, Disneyland 60th, Shanghai Disney up through Pandora.

I think the criticism is more one of spending (both by WDI, but more so Iger) than quality out of WDI during his tenure. Particularly if we just reflect on Radiator Springs Racers, Mystic Manor, Flight of Passage and Shanghai Pirates. That’s a very strong 10 year run. There are of course many misses.

It’s always gonna look not so great when you point at one resort, or one park, and say “see, they failed”. You do have to look at Disney parks on the global stage to really get a sense of what they’ve done over the years, where they’ve focused attention.
 

Stripes

Premium Member
8B*10 is 80. I’m not sure I understand what you are trying to say?

They are looking to average 6B in capital spend annually for ten years.

Year one was 5.4B. Next year meaningfully accelerates past that guidance. Which is definitely in part because of the lumpiness of the cruise ship builds.
Not quite. The $60 billion plan applies specifically to Experiences capex.

FY2024 Experiences capex was $3.66 billion. The company stated that capex would ramp up towards the back half of the 10 year plan, meaning that Experiences capex should be at or near $6 billion per year by FY2028 with even higher investment through 2034.
 

UNCgolf

Well-Known Member
I’m talking about global Disney projects. The creative quality of the expansions around the world during that time were top notch IMO, and that’s what Bruce was in charge of. Obviously Bruce didn’t have any control over the investment in WDW, but he did play a big role in the creation of Pandora and New Fantasyland.

But around the world, you have DCA 2.0, Cars Land, Mystic Manor, Grizzly Gulch, Shanghai Disneyland, Monsters Inc. Ride and Go Seek in Tokyo…

That's fair. I wasn't thinking globally, since what they're doing in international parks is kind of irrelevant for me -- I can't see myself ever going to any of them, because when I visit those places going to a Disney theme park is very, very far down the list of what I want to do.

To me, most of what was done at WDW in that time frame was a miss to varying degrees (Pandora the major exception). Some better than others, but none as good as it probably should have been. Again, though, I don't blame Bruce Vaughn for that.
 
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BrianLo

Well-Known Member
Not quite. The $60 billion plan applies specifically to Experiences capex.

FY2024 Experiences capex was $3.66 billion. The company stated that capex would ramp up towards the back half of the 10 year plan, meaning that Experiences capex should be at or near $6 billion per year by FY2028 with even higher investment through 2034.

Sorry, you are definitely right!

Albeit I'd expect a big chunk of the YoY 2.6B increase to be experiences related. Because of Treasure, Destiny and Adventure and the D23 projects kicking off.
 

Sirwalterraleigh

Premium Member
Guidance and Outlook:

  • We are confident in the long-term prospects for the business and believe we are well positioned for growth.
  • Fiscal 2025:
    • High-single digit adjusted EPS(1) growth compared to fiscal 2024
    • Approximately $15 billion in cash provided by operations
    • Approximately $8 billion of capital expenditures
    • Target dividend growth that tracks our earnings growth
    • Targeting $3 billion in stock repurchases
    • Entertainment: Double digit percentage segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024, weighted to the first half of the year
      • Entertainment DTC operating income increase of approximately $875 million versus fiscal 2024, which includes a comparison to an adverse impact of our India DTC business of approximately $200 million on fiscal 2024 Entertainment DTC results
      • Modest decline in Q1 Disney+ Core subscribers versus Q4
      • Q1 Content Sales/Licensing and Other operating income relatively in-line with Q4
    • Sports: 13% segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024 on a reported basis. Adjusting for the impact of our India business on Sports’ fiscal 2024 results, operating income is expected to decrease approximately 10%
    • Experiences: 6% to 8% segment operating income growth compared to fiscal 2024, weighted to the second half of the year
      • Q1 operating income adversely impacted by approximately $130 million due to Hurricanes Helene and Milton and approximately $90 million due to Disney Cruise Line pre-launch costs
  • Fiscal 2026(2):
    • Double digit adjusted EPS(1) growth
    • Double digit growth in cash provided by operations
    • When comparing to our fiscal 2025 guide, we expect:
      • Entertainment: Double digit percentage segment operating income growth; 10% operating margin for our Entertainment SVOD DTC businesses (excluding our Hulu Live DMVPD service)(1)
      • Sports: Low single digit percentage segment operating income growth
      • Experiences: High single digit percentage segment operating income growth
  • Fiscal 2027:
    • Double digit adjusted EPS(1) growth
…hook…line…
 

HauntedPirate

Park nostalgist
Premium Member
Unless you own the stock.....
I own the stock. I still hate it. It's an artificial way to boost the stock price, which primarily benefits large shareholders and executives. It takes cash away from reinvestment and other things in general. What else could Disney do with $3 billion? My previous employer spent far more than that on stock buybacks every year until Covid hit, and it's a factor in why the company's morale went down the drain. The general employee population finally realized how many billions were being spent on stock buybacks while their own salaries were going up a paltry 2-3% per year.
 

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