Spirited Spring Break News, Observations & Thoughts ...

[lazyboy97o]

I agree. My point is MT is more of an attraction than anything at Disney Springs (except Disney Quest). I think there is more to it than MT is not a theme park.

MT might have special rights gained prior to the Universal and Disney deals.

Not really. The deal states "theme park," and not attraction, except the concept that Marvel was developing and fits into a place like Downtown Disney/Disney Springs.

 

[Captain Neo]

You missed my point, Neo. Disney fears a similar incident/accusation against one of its creatives (most likely Imagineering as they ... um ... ahm ... have a rep). The only thing I can think of that would be worse than a sex scandal involving minors would be a terrorist attack. Nothing else.

And this story has nothing to do with Disney trying to tarnish anything. It's just a sad tale that you hope isn't true, but a voice inside tells you something else.

It's true. Bryan Singer has a pretty huge reputation doing this sort of thing. Some guy photobombed Singer's IMDB page with a lot of incriminating photos and it's a well known fact (heard from a friend and others have reported) that Singer hangs out in West Hollywood trying to meet younger guys promising them roles and jobs for future movies in order to take advantage of them.

 

[WDW1974]

JImmy Thick is a troll?

Please, tell me you are joking and that was sarcasm.

 

[Captain Neo]

Because it's Marvel. People see Marvel, they think Disney. At least they are starting to.

On the subject of Singer, this article makes for some interesting reading.
http://www.donmurphy.net/naked.html

This is not true at all. Majority of the people have no clue that Marvel is owned by Disney and Disney has made no effort to create any association between the two (You don't even see a Disney logo at the beginning of Marvel movies).

 

[lazyboy97o]

This is not true at all. Majority of the people have no clue that Marvel is owned by Disney and Disney has made no effort to create any association between the two (You don't even see a Disney logo at the beginning of Marvel movies).

Unless you step into a Disney Store...

 

[WDW1974]

Well it sounds really nice. I'm not sure how I would feel about a week in Orlando and not 100% up disney's butt though. Or immersed or whatever the lingo is .

Um ... um ... um ... yeah, that does speak for itself!

 

[doctornick]

Well, I may agree that 17-year-olds (and I'd even go a few years younger) are generally quite capable of consenting, but that is not what our laws say or reflect. You have sex with someone who is 17 years, 11 months old and you are going to jail (unless you are quite wealthy and/or powerful) and you'll be labeled a sex offender for life here in 'Merika.

Just a quibble, but age of consent varies from state to state. In fact, more states have an age of consent of 16 than have one of 18.

 

[Stevek]

Exactly how do you know this?

I don't want to get into how I know and I don't necessarily expect anyone to believe me. I don't have a horse in this race but I'm fairly confident that my comment is accurate.

 

[WDW1974]

Hey, some of my responses take time to write, but since you asked ...

WDW has never been cheap. However, it’s much more expensive than it once was.

Twenty-five years ago, a theme park view room during Christmas at the Grand Floridian went for $235/night (excluding tax), about $450/night today.

Twenty years ago, that room was up to $345/night, about $550/night today.

Ten years ago, that room was up to $430/night, about $540/night today.

Since Iger took charges, prices have taken off.

That room will cost $928/night for Christmas 2014.

Beyond the price increases, to understand what’s happening financially at WDW today, it’s necessary to recognize where the greatest margins are: the hotels. WDW’s hotels are money-making machines and are the key to WDW’s future financial success.

However, it’s also important to remember what feeds WDW’s hotels: the theme parks. Without the theme parks, WDW’s hotels are overpriced mid-to-entry-level rooms sitting on swampland. Guests don’t stay at WDW hotels because they want to vacation in Orlando, they stay because they want to vacation at WDW’s theme parks.

Anyone who’s compared WDW’s rates with offsite hotels recognizes how profitable they are. Using my favorite example, a 565 sq. ft. Family Suite at Art Of Animation often costs more than a 945 sq. ft. suite at the Waldorf Astoria (within walking distance of Art Of Animation).

If places like the Waldorf Astoria and Wyndham Bonnet Creek (located next to the Waldorf) can provide more for less, then WDW’s hotel prices have nothing to do with their quality or location on land that Walt paid $120/acre for; it has to do with having the “Disney” name as a prefix. It has to do with their direct association to the theme parks.

WDW’s future financial success is dependent on selling complete hotel and theme park vacation packages that attract discerning consumers to its Deluxe Resorts and yet still are within reach of the general public. Guests want to stay onsite but, in growing numbers, they just can’t find the value in it.

WDW’s greatest commercial problems fall into three categories.

First, a change in marketing strategy to focus on families with younger children rather than adults and adults with older children has driven away much of WDW’s high-end customer base. Those who easily can afford WDW’s Deluxe Resort prices are not visiting WDW in the same numbers they used to. WDW is losing this market to other alternatives because WDW no longer as competitive as it once was with an older market, a segment that tends to have more disposable income. This is not a WDW vs. Uni comparison; this is a WDW vs. every other vacation destination in the world comparison. In this market, WDW is competing less effectively than it once did.

Second, combined ticket and hotel prices have risen much more rapidly than those who dream of staying at WDW Deluxe and Moderate Resorts can afford. The lion’s share of WDW’s revenue is from middle-to-upper middle income families who want to experience what they view as “lifestyles of the rich and famous”. To them, a stay in the Grand Floridian represents the epitome of luxury. However, WDW price increases over the last 10-15 years have outpaced this segment’s income, forcing these guests to downgrade their stays to lower-margin Value Resort or even offsite. WDW slowly is pricing itself out of its core market.

Third, the continued expansion of Disney Vacation Club (DVC) has eroded the customer base at WDW’s high-margin resorts.

WDW’s early financial success was driven primarily by what happened at the theme parks. Just like Disneyland before it, the Magic Kingdom and EPCOT were high-risk/high-reward investments in the future that produced a positive cash flow for generations.

Yet the rest of Walt Disney Productions underperformed and Michael Eisner was brought onboard in 1984 to cure Disney’s woes in film and animation.

Early in the Eisner era, Sid Bass encouraged Eisner to expand WDW in order to take advantage of Disney’s land holdings. The strategy worked brilliantly. Theme and water parks were added. New Deluxe Resorts were brought online and operated at near capacity year-round. WDW began to offer moderate and value accommodations to appeal to a wider audience. WDW’s gross margins improved as guests flooded the onsite resorts in order to experience what was considered the complete WDW vacation.

The key to WDW’s success was:

1. Build, build, build – Make WDW an electrifying vacation destination that everyone, including the adults and older children, wanted to visit.
   
2. Price control - Maintain prices that closely tracked people’s ability to pay for them.

As long as WDW grew, customers across all economic and age groups were drawn into the glowing orb of an electrifying WDW. WDW never was inexpensive but it was within reach. As long as vacationers felt they could afford both tickets and WDW hotel stays, they bought both.

WDW’s period of greatest financial success followed the decades when the theme parks expanded and tickets closely followed Median Household Income. WDW knew their target audience and operated accordingly.

The opening of Value Resort beginning in 1994 helped mitigate the effect of rapid prices increases that started in that late 1990s. However, as WDW continued its price expansion into the 2000s, the lower-margin Value Resorts eroded margins as guests downgraded from WDW’s Deluxe and Moderate Resorts to Value Resorts.

Things truly headed south in the post-9/11 era when travel suffered. Parks & Resorts performed well in FY2001 (ending in September 2001) but Eisner was under an increasing strain because of a growing number of misfires outside of WDW.

It was at this time that corporate Disney hastened the trend started in the late 1990s and raised prices even faster.

It’s an understandable strategy. When external market forces adversely impact business and when the CEO is under pressure to produce strong results, companies often sail into a safe harbor to weather the storm. In WDW’s case, this meant higher prices, quality cuts, and stagnation. This strategy can work but only temporarily. Long-term, this approach leads to gradual decline.

It was at the same time that WDW embarked on another short-term strategy with long-term consequences: DVC.

Corporately, timeshares are great; they infuse a company with quick high-margin cash. However, they sacrifice long-term profits for the sake of short-term profits.

In WDW’s case, DVC stole guests away from Disney’s obscenely profitable Deluxe Resorts and provided these vacationers with decades of Deluxe Resort style rooms at significantly reduced rates.

In the 1990s, WDW operated only 2 DVC resorts with a combined total of about 900 units. Since then, the number of DVC units has more than tripled, taking business directly away from Deluxe and even Moderate Resorts, robbing the company of high-margin profits. Families who once might have stayed at Deluxe or Moderate Resorts plopped over big money once for the promise of much less expensive stays for years to come.

Infused with the quick cash from DVC sales, P&R financial performance rebounded in the late 2000s. It never remotely approached peak levels but gross margin did recover modestly after cratering at 13.1% in FY2005.

During the economic downturn that followed, WDW offered a series of incredible discounts in order to keep hotel occupancy rates up. It worked. WDW occupancy was 86% in 2006, 89% in 2007, 90% in 2008, and 87% in 2009.

However, it also whetted the public’s appetite for discounts. Once those steep discounts ended and the flood of DVC inventory began to take effect, occupancy plummeted at WDW’s higher-end hotels. Non-DVC members began to wise up to the value of renting DVC points. Deluxe Resorts had to complete directly with the growing number of DVC members who rented out their points.

Without a series of flashy new theme park expansions constantly repolishing the WDW orb, the luster of a complete WDW vacation faded. WDW now attracts “The Easy To Please” crowd.

WDW has become a rite of passage for the current generation, a place for parents to bring their strollered youngsters before they grow out of WDW’s dumbed-down childish offerings. Rather than appeal to single adults or older parents in their peak earning years, WDW unwittingly is targeting those least able to splurge on high-end hotel stays.

Of course WDW hotel occupancies are down at Disney’s Deluxe Resorts. The crowd that WDW is catering to cannot afford them.

Of course margins are down even as the Magic Kingdom is bursting at the seams. Vacationers are staying offsite, bopping into MK for a day or two, and then heading off elsewhere to enjoy the other offerings in Orlando. WDW no longer is the only game in town and without the Magic Kingdom drawing people in, WDW’s other 3 parks would suffer terribly.

Add it all together and you have an organization that continues to make short-term blunders that will lead to long-term institutional problems.

As demonstrated by the New Fantasyland expansion targeted towards young children, the latest price increases, DVC expansions, nickel-and-dime quality cuts, disappointing Art of Animation Family Suite bookings, decision to proceed with MyMagic+, and delays in Pandora and Star Wars Land, Parks & Resorts is an organization that continues to make the same mistakes that had caused it to underperform in the first place.

Love it!!!

Perfect summation of WDW's current predicament.

You might want to send it on to George.Kalogridis@Disney.com just for kicks. Tell him, his old pal '74' told you to send it his way.

 

[WDW1974]

This is not true at all. Majority of the people have no clue that Marvel is owned by Disney and Disney has made no effort to create any association between the two (You don't even see a Disney logo at the beginning of Marvel movies).

I don't know. You may well be right. Most people don't know what planet they are on these days.

Disney certainly has made many efforts at tying Marvel into the company from retail outlets, to the Phineas and Ferb deal with the Marvel characters, to Agents of S.H.I.E.L.D ... how many people know this, though ... that's tougher.

I think many people think Shrek is Disney owned, they can take a monorail to the whale and fish park and that Space Mountain was built by NASA.

People are dumber than dirt these days. I blame the Internet ... and the government.

 

[the.dreamfinder]

This is not true at all. Majority of the people have no clue that Marvel is owned by Disney and Disney has made no effort to create any association between the two (You don't even see a Disney logo at the beginning of Marvel movies).

This is not just about Marvel. This is a scandal that offers the folks at TWDC an opportunity to study how to address allegations of sexual assault on the worldwide stage. Spirit told you that next to a terrorist attack at the parks, a sex abuse scandal is their biggest fear. WDI in particular has an ah um... reputation...
for things that would be considered illegal. A sex scandal is a big deal. It's pretty much the only thing that can take Iger, Rasulo, Staggs, and company down because they won't just have us Disney fans to contend with, but millions of very, very angry parents, upset and confused children and a severely tarnished brand in addition to lots scrutiny from law enforcement and the federal government.

I would bet there is a team in Burbank watching this scandal very closely, especially 20th Century Fox's response, because they know this could easily happen at Disney.

 

[WDW1974]

Just a quibble, but age of consent varies from state to state. In fact, more states have an age of consent of 16 than have one of 18.

Most of those have crazy 'fine print' that basically says it may be OK for a 16 year-old girl to date an 18-year-old college freshman ... but if that 16-year-old wants to date and have relations with the 33-year-old fanboi that lives next door in Mom's basement then he's going to jail unless her parents look the other way.

A TRUE age of consent deal for a 16-year-old would give said individual full rights over their sexual choices and their bodies.

 

[WDW1974]

I don't want to get into how I know and I don't necessarily expect anyone to believe me. I don't have a horse in this race but I'm fairly confident that my comment is accurate.

I am not saying you are lying. I think you are probably being accurate to the best of your knowledge, but when you don't tell us how you know that, it muddies the waters ... as I am sure you can figure out.

Either way, I don't much care ... Surrell has shown himself to be a hot-headed, out of control guy on many occasions and whether or not he wanted to keep this bout of insanity private really isn't the point.

I was thinking of writing a note to Dr. Blondie or Crazy Gary and asking ''Do any of you ever think to say, Surrell what the (blank) are you thinking?' But it would be a waste of time and effort.

 

[the.dreamfinder]

Speaking of things that worry TWDC
http://deadline.com/2014/04/espn-ho...-concerns-about-cord-cutting-and-competition/

 

[Captain Neo]

This is not just about Marvel. This is a scandal that offers the folks at TWDC an opportunity to study how to address allegations of sexual assault on the worldwide stage. Spirit told you that next to a terrorist attack at the parks, a sex abuse scandal is their biggest fear. WDI in particular has an ah um... reputation...
for things that would be considered illegal. A sex scandal is a big deal. It's pretty much the only thing that can take Iger, Rasulo, Staggs, and company down because they won't just have us Disney fans to contend with, but millions of very, very angry parents, upset and confused children and a severely tarnished brand in addition to lots scrutiny from law enforcement and the federal government.

I would bet there is a team in Burbank watching this scandal very closely, especially 20th Century Fox's response, because they know this could easily happen at Disney.

Did I wake up in a world where the Michael Jackson, Woody Allen, and Roman Polanski scandals didn't happen? This is nothing new in Hollywood

 

[the.dreamfinder]

Did I wake up in a world where the Michael Jackson, Woody Allen, and Roman Polanski scandals didn't happen? This is nothing new in Hollywood

You're missing the point. A sex scandal at TWDC/WDI would have much more fallout and would require a very carefully crafted response.

 

[bubbles1812]

This is not true at all. Majority of the people have no clue that Marvel is owned by Disney and Disney has made no effort to create any association between the two (You don't even see a Disney logo at the beginning of Marvel movies).

I also alluded to this idea earlier though I may disagree that the majority of people don't know. I think a good amount of people know it's Disney-Marvel...mainly because I decent amount of people know Disney has bought up a lot of stuff. The Marvel acquisition was a least well publicized, same way the Lucas Films deal was. But, at the same time doesn't get more than a passing thought, if at all. And your point about the Marvel movies is certainly correct. You see the Marvel Studios logo and that's it, unlike say under the Fox-Xmen and Sony-Spiderman banners, along with the Marvel logo. But people know those studios are associated with those particular franchises. But still again, it doesn't really get much of a thought.

If anything, I think it's a smart move that Disney hasn't tried to amp up their association with Marvel. Disney is still thought of by many as the place for little kids, no matter how good a product may be. I don't think that's what people necessarily want for their superheros. It's similar in how ESPN or ABC are treated by Disney. You don't exactly see the Disney logo across those channels. The association is known, but it isn't necessary to point out constantly.

You're missing the point. A sex scandal at TWDC/WDI would have much more fallout and would require a very carefully crafted response.

It would certainly be interesting to watch how PR would handle a scenario like that. You don't want to be the #1 children's entertainment company in the world and then have that happen. (Well, you don't want to have it happen ever, but I agree it would have the potential to severely damage the Disney brand). I wouldn't be surprised if they already have scenarios and playbooks as to how to handle something like that, or at least a "spin doctor" on call just in case something ever did happen for any number of "things have gone bad" events.

 

[Lee]

This is not true at all. Majority of the people have no clue that Marvel is owned by Disney and Disney has made no effort to create any association between the two (You don't even see a Disney logo at the beginning of Marvel movies).

Notice the part where I said "they are starting to" associate Marvel with Disney. Disney certainly isn't hiding their ownership.

An instance like this, where there will be a considerable amount of press, will only increase the public's awareness. It is sure to be mentioned in the reporting, something along the lines of "Marvel, a subsidiary of the Walt Disney Company, had no immediate response"....

 

[John]

Hey, some of my responses take time to write, but since you asked ...

WDW has never been cheap. However, it’s much more expensive than it once was.

Twenty-five years ago, a theme park view room during Christmas at the Grand Floridian went for $235/night (excluding tax), about $450/night today.

Twenty years ago, that room was up to $345/night, about $550/night today.

Ten years ago, that room was up to $430/night, about $540/night today.

Since Iger took charges, prices have taken off.

That room will cost $928/night for Christmas 2014.

Beyond the price increases, to understand what’s happening financially at WDW today, it’s necessary to recognize where the greatest margins are: the hotels. WDW’s hotels are money-making machines and are the key to WDW’s future financial success.

However, it’s also important to remember what feeds WDW’s hotels: the theme parks. Without the theme parks, WDW’s hotels are overpriced mid-to-entry-level rooms sitting on swampland. Guests don’t stay at WDW hotels because they want to vacation in Orlando, they stay because they want to vacation at WDW’s theme parks.

Anyone who’s compared WDW’s rates with offsite hotels recognizes how profitable they are. Using my favorite example, a 565 sq. ft. Family Suite at Art Of Animation often costs more than a 945 sq. ft. suite at the Waldorf Astoria (within walking distance of Art Of Animation).

If places like the Waldorf Astoria and Wyndham Bonnet Creek (located next to the Waldorf) can provide more for less, then WDW’s hotel prices have nothing to do with their quality or location on land that Walt paid $120/acre for; it has to do with having the “Disney” name as a prefix. It has to do with their direct association to the theme parks.

WDW’s future financial success is dependent on selling complete hotel and theme park vacation packages that attract discerning consumers to its Deluxe Resorts and yet still are within reach of the general public. Guests want to stay onsite but, in growing numbers, they just can’t find the value in it.

WDW’s greatest commercial problems fall into three categories.

First, a change in marketing strategy to focus on families with younger children rather than adults and adults with older children has driven away much of WDW’s high-end customer base. Those who easily can afford WDW’s Deluxe Resort prices are not visiting WDW in the same numbers they used to. WDW is losing this market to other alternatives because WDW no longer as competitive as it once was with an older market, a segment that tends to have more disposable income. This is not a WDW vs. Uni comparison; this is a WDW vs. every other vacation destination in the world comparison. In this market, WDW is competing less effectively than it once did.

Second, combined ticket and hotel prices have risen much more rapidly than those who dream of staying at WDW Deluxe and Moderate Resorts can afford. The lion’s share of WDW’s revenue is from middle-to-upper middle income families who want to experience what they view as “lifestyles of the rich and famous”. To them, a stay in the Grand Floridian represents the epitome of luxury. However, WDW price increases over the last 10-15 years have outpaced this segment’s income, forcing these guests to downgrade their stays to lower-margin Value Resort or even offsite. WDW slowly is pricing itself out of its core market.

Third, the continued expansion of Disney Vacation Club (DVC) has eroded the customer base at WDW’s high-margin resorts.

WDW’s early financial success was driven primarily by what happened at the theme parks. Just like Disneyland before it, the Magic Kingdom and EPCOT were high-risk/high-reward investments in the future that produced a positive cash flow for generations.

Yet the rest of Walt Disney Productions underperformed and Michael Eisner was brought onboard in 1984 to cure Disney’s woes in film and animation.

Early in the Eisner era, Sid Bass encouraged Eisner to expand WDW in order to take advantage of Disney’s land holdings. The strategy worked brilliantly. Theme and water parks were added. New Deluxe Resorts were brought online and operated at near capacity year-round. WDW began to offer moderate and value accommodations to appeal to a wider audience. WDW’s gross margins improved as guests flooded the onsite resorts in order to experience what was considered the complete WDW vacation.

The key to WDW’s success was:

1. Build, build, build – Make WDW an electrifying vacation destination that everyone, including the adults and older children, wanted to visit.
   
2. Price control - Maintain prices that closely tracked people’s ability to pay for them.

As long as WDW grew, customers across all economic and age groups were drawn into the glowing orb of an electrifying WDW. WDW never was inexpensive but it was within reach. As long as vacationers felt they could afford both tickets and WDW hotel stays, they bought both.

WDW’s period of greatest financial success followed the decades when the theme parks expanded and tickets closely followed Median Household Income. WDW knew their target audience and operated accordingly.

The opening of Value Resort beginning in 1994 helped mitigate the effect of rapid prices increases that started in that late 1990s. However, as WDW continued its price expansion into the 2000s, the lower-margin Value Resorts eroded margins as guests downgraded from WDW’s Deluxe and Moderate Resorts to Value Resorts.

Things truly headed south in the post-9/11 era when travel suffered. Parks & Resorts performed well in FY2001 (ending in September 2001) but Eisner was under an increasing strain because of a growing number of misfires outside of WDW.

It was at this time that corporate Disney hastened the trend started in the late 1990s and raised prices even faster.

It’s an understandable strategy. When external market forces adversely impact business and when the CEO is under pressure to produce strong results, companies often sail into a safe harbor to weather the storm. In WDW’s case, this meant higher prices, quality cuts, and stagnation. This strategy can work but only temporarily. Long-term, this approach leads to gradual decline.

It was at the same time that WDW embarked on another short-term strategy with long-term consequences: DVC.

Corporately, timeshares are great; they infuse a company with quick high-margin cash. However, they sacrifice long-term profits for the sake of short-term profits.

In WDW’s case, DVC stole guests away from Disney’s obscenely profitable Deluxe Resorts and provided these vacationers with decades of Deluxe Resort style rooms at significantly reduced rates.

In the 1990s, WDW operated only 2 DVC resorts with a combined total of about 900 units. Since then, the number of DVC units has more than tripled, taking business directly away from Deluxe and even Moderate Resorts, robbing the company of high-margin profits. Families who once might have stayed at Deluxe or Moderate Resorts plopped over big money once for the promise of much less expensive stays for years to come.

Infused with the quick cash from DVC sales, P&R financial performance rebounded in the late 2000s. It never remotely approached peak levels but gross margin did recover modestly after cratering at 13.1% in FY2005.

During the economic downturn that followed, WDW offered a series of incredible discounts in order to keep hotel occupancy rates up. It worked. WDW occupancy was 86% in 2006, 89% in 2007, 90% in 2008, and 87% in 2009.

However, it also whetted the public’s appetite for discounts. Once those steep discounts ended and the flood of DVC inventory began to take effect, occupancy plummeted at WDW’s higher-end hotels. Non-DVC members began to wise up to the value of renting DVC points. Deluxe Resorts had to complete directly with the growing number of DVC members who rented out their points.

Without a series of flashy new theme park expansions constantly repolishing the WDW orb, the luster of a complete WDW vacation faded. WDW now attracts “The Easy To Please” crowd.

WDW has become a rite of passage for the current generation, a place for parents to bring their strollered youngsters before they grow out of WDW’s dumbed-down childish offerings. Rather than appeal to single adults or older parents in their peak earning years, WDW unwittingly is targeting those least able to splurge on high-end hotel stays.

Of course WDW hotel occupancies are down at Disney’s Deluxe Resorts. The crowd that WDW is catering to cannot afford them.

Of course margins are down even as the Magic Kingdom is bursting at the seams. Vacationers are staying offsite, bopping into MK for a day or two, and then heading off elsewhere to enjoy the other offerings in Orlando. WDW no longer is the only game in town and without the Magic Kingdom drawing people in, WDW’s other 3 parks would suffer terribly.

Add it all together and you have an organization that continues to make short-term blunders that will lead to long-term institutional problems.

As demonstrated by the New Fantasyland expansion targeted towards young children, the latest price increases, DVC expansions, nickel-and-dime quality cuts, disappointing Art of Animation Family Suite bookings, decision to proceed with MyMagic+, and delays in Pandora and Star Wars Land, Parks & Resorts is an organization that continues to make the same mistakes that had caused it to underperform in the first place.

SUPERB!!!!!! Well done, the only thing I will add ( because I have little social graces and I am not as eloquent as PO4) that the clientele that were considered the "whales" see the writing on the wall. They see the guest. They don't want to rub elbows with "those" types of people. Before you start throwing flame bombs....I am socially and financially closer to "those" people then I am any sort of whale. Upwardly mobile guest knopw quality when they see it....."those" people are soooooo easy to please. All they need to do is give little Suzie a autograph book a photopass package and their day is set. Build great immersive attractions? Why? Don't you know Suzie is scared of the dark and gets sick on Dumbo. WDW is absolutely magical......to a five year old.

As far as I am concerned the die is cast, we will get a Rassulo for our next CEO....follow the money....right?
They are more interested in getting praise from $2,000 suits then they are getting praise from their customers.
A lot of people still think the place is wonderful, but from what I have seen is MOST of those (not all) never visited WDW during its golden years and has no real point of reference.

In a few weeks they are sgoing to have a huge press shinding to announce FLE and the new kiddie coaster, IMO its a big yawn fest. Most of the area has been open for sometime and is now yesterdays news. Like adding the McRib sandwich to the menu....its great the first three times you eat it but then you remember why you don't eat at Mickey's.....pun intended.

 

[Stevek]

I am not saying you are lying. I think you are probably being accurate to the best of your knowledge, but when you don't tell us how you know that, it muddies the waters ... as I am sure you can figure out.

Totally get it and knew that might happen when I posted the info. I'll leave you with a couple of things..

1) Look at my fairly insignificant posting history. I'm not one that's here looking for attention, trying to become a personality, not particularly argumentative and clearly not a pot stirrer. I really gain nothing, nor am I looking for anything, by posting this info. I'm your average Joe Disney Park fan who comes here for some info and harmless banter once in awhile. I merely posted it to provide some insight into what I'm confident actually happened.

2) If you have the actual tweets in question, I don't, you would notice a couple of things. They aren't directed @ anybody which obviously happens a lot AND they aren't part of conversation with anyone. They really were just random out of context comments, not tied to anything which somewhat supports they were part of something outside the standard twitter stream i.e. direct messages.

Jason wouldn't know me from a hole in the ground. I don't know Jason, have only met him once as he delivered his standard spiel in front of the Star Wars teaser display at D23. And I'm sure he's not really looking for (or cares quite honestly) for some lowly message board lackey like me to defend him. But people do make mistakes on twitter, fb, text messages, e-mail and put things out there that they really didn't mean to. Heck, I've had my fair share of regrettable FB posts after a few drinks. Sometimes, regardless of how we feel about a particular person, we can give them the benefit of the doubt. But maybe that's just me...