jakeman
Well-Known Member
If you can't rely on someone to look out the rearview mirrors when backing up a monorail how can you rely on the same person to pay attention as a spotter. There just adding numbers to improve their odds of catching a problem. Keep in mind it took at least three people not paying attention to cause the accident. To me there are really only two options. One they could hire more skilled people instead of the bottom of the barrel people willing to accept $7.50 an hour, and put them through rigorous training. Or they could just automate the system.
There is no indication so far that fatigue was a factor in this accident.Adding another set of eyes, should in theory at least, help avoid the same kind of incident. However, from the sound of it, the policies they had in place were sound, they just didn't follow them to the letter, and there was one person who wasn't there. I'm going to speculate that fatigue played a major factor in the failure of those who were on duty. Ultimately, this was a chain of errors that rests on several people's failures to properly and safely do their job. The extra set of eyes being added to the policy will certainly help, but if anything can be learned from this incident it's that people are going to make mistakes, especially when they're tired and it's late at night.
I would recommend one or more of the following. 1) Operators and controller, be restricted to working no more than 6-8 hours in the train and on the control board. If possible, a night shift supervisor/safety officer should be there for late night operations. 2)The trains should have cameras for operating in reverse. 3)More Automation. The sensor system (MAPO) should be improved and made "smarter". I understand it has to be disabled for backing operations, this indicates to me that it's a "dumb" system, probably a bit out of date. They can and should look into upgrading/replacing it.
It's easy to say, "Train them more. Pay them more. Limit their hours." but that may not address the core issue.
So far it appears that this was a break down in SOPs reaching back as far as 20 years.
That's not something that can be fixed overnight or without critical imput from multiple functional group.
It seems that the root cause analysis of this issue will not lend itself to a simple answer.