News Reedy Creek Improvement District and the Central Florida Tourism Oversight District

flynnibus

Premium Member
I can understand the argument that if you cannot definitively prove motive
But that's just it.. it's not *if* you can prove motive, it's NOT RELEVANT in the angles being discussed there. That's the ugly side of the O'Brian SCOTUS case and these other interpretations that are premised on it.

The test from O'Brian isn't predicated on motive AT ALL. It's based on weighing the legitimate government interest in the action vs the limitation on speech. The legislative immunity angle cited in the other cases again is not about if motive is discernable or provable - but if the actions are basically provable to be of merit OUTSIDE of the retaliatory moves.

At the base of it, it is very saddening when you think such a fundamental principal is so blatently able to be stepped on... but this is why the topic is so complicated in the courts.

That said... I know of cases that have gone the other way to great negative consequence to the public in the face of upholding the 1A. In Ocean City MD the government lost multiple times trying to regulate street performers on their boardwalk (including very obvious flaunting of business regulation and other negative impacts to others) on 1A grounds.
 

sanctumsolitude

Active Member
Don't everyone celebrate just yet.
While some attorneys are saying Disney has a strong case, this one says otherwise.
Worth the short read. In short, it's a complex matter and the judge could toss out at least their first amendment claims.
In looking thru the suit, I have to wonder if Disney's lawyers felt this as well, and put the first amendment violations as causes number 4 and 5, thinking they might have a lesser chance.


My 2 cents (if worth that) is that that is the wrong precedent for this lawsuit. Instead, the eleventh circuit’s ruling in Gwinnett County is more applicable. Here is the text from the very case they cite:

32 What our decision in Gwinnett County means, and whether it is distinguishable, is a question of law that we decide de novo. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011). It is distinguishable. The facts of that case limit the holding of the decision to acts of governmental retaliation that explicitly single out a specific group. In that case, a school board adopted its superintendent’s recommendation to terminate the automatic payroll deduction of membership dues for members of the Georgia Association of Educators (GAE) and its local affiliate, the Gwinnett County Association of Educators (GCAE). 856 F.2d at 143–44. The recommendation came after the superintendent clashed with the GCAE over its representation of school system employees before the board and its affiliation with the National Education Association. Id. at 144 & n.1. The board members admitted that they had terminated the payroll dues deduction services for those reasons. Id. at 144. This Court held that — despite the fact that the teachers union had no constitutional right to automatic payroll deduction of membership dues — the county board of education could not deny the union’s members the benefit of that service as a “sanction[] for the expression of particular views it opposes.” Id. at 145 (quotation marks omitted).The crucial fact in Gwinnett County is that the school board did not adopt a generally applicable policy — it specifically singled out “GAE-GCAE members.”
 

Touchdown

Well-Known Member
But that's just it.. it's not *if* you can prove motive, it's NOT RELEVANT in the angles being discussed there. That's the ugly side of the O'Brian SCOTUS case and these other interpretations that are premised on it.

The test from O'Brian isn't predicated on motive AT ALL. It's based on weighing the legitimate government interest in the action vs the limitation on speech. The legislative immunity angle cited in the other cases again is not about if motive is discernable or provable - but if the actions are basically provable to be of merit OUTSIDE of the retaliatory moves.

At the base of it, it is very saddening when you think such a fundamental principal is so blatently able to be stepped on... but this is why the topic is so complicated in the courts.

That said... I know of cases that have gone the other way to great negative consequence to the public in the face of upholding the 1A. In Ocean City MD the government lost multiple times trying to regulate street performers on their boardwalk (including very obvious flaunting of business regulation and other negative impacts to others) on 1A grounds.
It’s also going to be exceedingly difficult to show legitimate government intent here though. What exactly has these acts accomplished to help the govt?
 

Sirwalterraleigh

Premium Member
That is why Florida does have a chance of winning on the first bill. However the February 2023 bill is not just ending RCID it is mean, evil, vindictive and designed to hurt Disney. Florida has no chance of winning on that one. Then who gets hurt, the 2 counties and DeSantis because the second the court rules the February bill unconstitutional the bonds are no longer Disney's responsibly if the first bill is allowed. Further, Disney also wins because they will be under the 2 counties jurisdiction and not the States dictatorial BS.
I don’t think that’s how it will play. If disneh wins they’ll look for reset…”grandfathering”
 

GoofGoof

Premium Member
But that's just it.. it's not *if* you can prove motive, it's NOT RELEVANT in the angles being discussed there. That's the ugly side of the O'Brian SCOTUS case and these other interpretations that are premised on it.

The test from O'Brian isn't predicated on motive AT ALL. It's based on weighing the legitimate government interest in the action vs the limitation on speech. The legislative immunity angle cited in the other cases again is not about if motive is discernable or provable - but if the actions are basically provable to be of merit OUTSIDE of the retaliatory moves.

At the base of it, it is very saddening when you think such a fundamental principal is so blatently able to be stepped on... but this is why the topic is so complicated in the courts.

That said... I know of cases that have gone the other way to great negative consequence to the public in the face of upholding the 1A. In Ocean City MD the government lost multiple times trying to regulate street performers on their boardwalk (including very obvious flaunting of business regulation and other negative impacts to others) on 1A grounds.
I still don’t think it’s the same circumstances. In O’Brian the act by the government was to pass a criminal law that the plaintiff was then arrested for violating but he claimed it suppressed his Freedom of Speech. The ruling was essentially that the public interest in passing that law superceded the plaintiffs rights to free speech. The case had nothing to do with motive of the legislature. They were clear in passing a ban on burning draft cards that the intent was to stop people from burning draft cards.

In this case the legality of the law passed is not in question (or I should say not directly in question on 1A grounds, the contract issues are separate) but it was done in retaliation and to punish. So the cases to look at are probably more around retaliatory arrests. In this case it’s not a retaliatory arrest of an individual but a retaliatory action against a corporation.
 

GoofGoof

Premium Member
My 2 cents (if worth that) is that that is the wrong precedent for this lawsuit. Instead, the eleventh circuit’s ruling in Gwinnett County is more applicable. Here is the text from the very case they cite:

32 What our decision in Gwinnett County means, and whether it is distinguishable, is a question of law that we decide de novo. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011). It is distinguishable. The facts of that case limit the holding of the decision to acts of governmental retaliation that explicitly single out a specific group. In that case, a school board adopted its superintendent’s recommendation to terminate the automatic payroll deduction of membership dues for members of the Georgia Association of Educators (GAE) and its local affiliate, the Gwinnett County Association of Educators (GCAE). 856 F.2d at 143–44. The recommendation came after the superintendent clashed with the GCAE over its representation of school system employees before the board and its affiliation with the National Education Association. Id. at 144 & n.1. The board members admitted that they had terminated the payroll dues deduction services for those reasons. Id. at 144. This Court held that — despite the fact that the teachers union had no constitutional right to automatic payroll deduction of membership dues — the county board of education could not deny the union’s members the benefit of that service as a “sanction[] for the expression of particular views it opposes.” Id. at 145 (quotation marks omitted).The crucial fact in Gwinnett County is that the school board did not adopt a generally applicable policy — it specifically singled out “GAE-GCAE members.”
This makes a lot of sense to be a really good precedent. The government did not enact a generally applicable policy, it specifically singled out an entity. Sound familiar? In this case the court also confirmed that while the union had no constitutional right to the benefit that was revoked (just like Disney has no constitutional right to a special district), the government could not deny that benefit as a sanction for the expression of particular views they oppose. Also sounds familiar. Good work finding this one :)
 

flynnibus

Premium Member
It’s also going to be exceedingly difficult to show legitimate government intent here though. What exactly has these acts accomplished to help the govt?
I already covered this in other posts and don’t want to keep repeating.

Things lije clarify the city vs district and other modernizations in 9B…. 4C was targeted at a specific set of districts that peceded the constitution update and still provided a path to revive. I think 4c is harder to argue because it is so generic… where 9b has changes that can be argued as with purpose
 

GrumpyFan

Well-Known Member
The argument makes sense to me but I hope they are wrong.

Not for Disney’s sake, really. But if the courts give the government the green light to target people for their speech, that seems like a very bad precedent that is bound to be repeatedly abused in the near future.

Especially given how absolutely blatant and clear cut this scenario was.
From my completely unprofessional (not a lawyer) view, I agree. The actions by Desantis and the legislature seem egregious and quite clearly targeted retaliation to censor speech. I sincerely hope one or more judges will see it that way.

I just wish more people would see it this way as well. Many seem to want to take the other view and punish Disney and their “woke agenda”, and fail to see the danger of a government body being allowed to go after a private business or entity in this way.
 

flynnibus

Premium Member
In this case the legality of the law passed is not in question (or I should say not directly in question on 1A grounds, the contract issues are separate) but it was done in retaliation and to punish.

Again, it’s not about legal or not… it’s an argument over the legitimate purpose of the act by the legislature. As you acknowledged, the case didn’t even weigh the motives of the legislators- in O’Brian they even go as far as discrediting the motive argument because it assumes the actions of one isn’t necessarily applicable to all.

The merits of these different cases falls down to assessing if the outcome of the change was for a facility valid purpose… beyond the impacts to the plaintiffs.

So the cases to look at are probably more around retaliatory arrests. In this case it’s not a retaliatory arrest of an individual but a retaliatory action against a corporation.

Arrests are an even worse comparison because they are acts that clearly about one person… unless you are talking aboug the law they were arrested under.
 

Chi84

Premium Member
I still don’t think it’s the same circumstances. In O’Brian the act by the government was to pass a criminal law that the plaintiff was then arrested for violating but he claimed it suppressed his Freedom of Speech. The ruling was essentially that the public interest in passing that law superceded the plaintiffs rights to free speech. The case had nothing to do with motive of the legislature. They were clear in passing a ban on burning draft cards that the intent was to stop people from burning draft cards.

In this case the legality of the law passed is not in question (or I should say not directly in question on 1A grounds, the contract issues are separate) but it was done in retaliation and to punish. So the cases to look at are probably more around retaliatory arrests. In this case it’s not a retaliatory arrest of an individual but a retaliatory action against a corporation.
I think what you're saying is that United States v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 (1968), and its progeny deal with laws that limit a constitutional right either on their face or in their application. O'Brien argued that the subject of the act - criminalizing burning a draft card - while not on its face an abridgment of free speech, was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was using it as expressive conduct. It seems that the other cases being cited also involve legislative action that, by its terms, involve protected acts. In Disney's case, the legislative action does not involve union membership or draft-card burning or any other protected right. I'm still looking at cases, but it seems in every case it is the content of the legislation that is being examined for its impact on protected activity. Special district legislation does not involve protected activity. This is just using an otherwise valid law as a weapon to punish one particular enemy for its past protected speech.

I'm getting there @LAKid53. Moving on to bills of attainder and the Nixon decision lol.
 
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flynnibus

Premium Member
Probably the biggest keystone in the defense using legitimate purposes to ignore the motive argument would be the change of the makeup of the district’s board. To goto the extreme they did… including some of the qualifiers on eligibility…. Are some of the strongest retorts to the facility valid arguments.

But I don’t know what it would mean for ghe court to see some of the law’s changes valid, and others not.

I still think this will be a defense the state side plays
 

GoofGoof

Premium Member
I think what you're saying is that United States v. O'Brien, 391 US 367 (1968), and its progeny deal with laws that limit a constitutional right either on their face or in their application. O'Brien argued that the subject of the act - criminalizing burning a draft card - while not on its face an abridgment of free speech, was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was using it as expressive conduct. It seems that the other cases being cited also involve legislative action that, by its terms, involve protected acts. In Disney's case, the legislative action does not involve union membership or draft-card burning or any other protected right. I'm still looking at cases, but it seems in every case it is the content of the legislation that is being examined for its impact on protected activity.

I'm getting there @LAKid53. Moving on to bills of attainder and the Nixon decision lol.
I’m not a lawyer so could be way off base but it’s direct vs indirect. In O’Brien the government passed a law that was being challenged as directly limiting free speech (a symbolic action not actual words coming from someone). In the Disney case the law itself is not directly limiting Disney’s free speech, but it was a retaliation against them for speaking out. So I don’t think they are the same thing. The Gwinnett County case seems more similar to me in that the action of the government itself did not directly limit the union’s speech (and was otherwise legal outside of motive) but the court ruled that it was retaliatory and that the government entity could not revoke a benefit as a sanction for expressing a view.
 

mikejs78

Premium Member
Don't everyone celebrate just yet.
While some attorneys are saying Disney has a strong case, this one says otherwise.
Worth the short read. In short, it's a complex matter and the judge could toss out at least their first amendment claims.
In looking thru the suit, I have to wonder if Disney's lawyers felt this as well, and put the first amendment violations as causes number 4 and 5, thinking they might have a lesser chance.


The article, while informative, misunderstands some of the facts surrounding Reedy Creek and Disney's complaint.

He subscribes to the mistaken fact that Disney runs Reedy Creek, rather than Disney elects members. So he equates the bill to removing Disney's governmental function, which is not quite accurate. What the bill did is remove their representation.
 

GrumpyFan

Well-Known Member
He subscribes to the mistaken fact that Disney runs Reedy Creek, rather than Disney elects members. So he equates the bill to removing Disney's governmental function, which is not quite accurate. What the bill did is remove their representation.
Very true, but I don’t recall seeing that this was their primary focus in the suit. Or did I just miss it? Seems this should be a higher priority but I’m not sure exactly what the Florida statute says in this regard. Either it’s a more difficult issue to include in the suit or maybe a round 2 or 3 that the lawyers have planned if this fails. I don’t think it would surprise any of us here to see Disney fire off another suit very quickly if this one fails.
 

RamblinWreck

Well-Known Member
From my completely unprofessional (not a lawyer) view, I agree. The actions by Desantis and the legislature seem egregious and quite clearly targeted retaliation to censor speech. I sincerely hope one or more judges will see it that way.

I just wish more people would see it this way as well. Many seem to want to take the other view and punish Disney and their “woke agenda”, and fail to see the danger of a government body being allowed to go after a private business or entity in this way.
It’s all fine when it’s happening to the other guys!

People are very short sighted.
 

mikejs78

Premium Member
I already covered this in other posts and don’t want to keep repeating.

Things lije clarify the city vs district and other modernizations in 9B…. 4C was targeted at a specific set of districts that peceded the constitution update and still provided a path to revive. I think 4c is harder to argue because it is so generic… where 9b has changes that can be argued as with purpose

The interesting bit about 4C is that it ignored the process set up in state law to remove special districts.
 

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