Not sure if it's actually "obstructionist" to have a normal permitting process take over from a rubber stamping process which was the point of RCID to Disney. Not to mention the hypocrisy of disney complaining about permitting delays when RCID would delay the permits of any other entity in the district if they dared to use non disney approved vendors.
-
Welcome to the WDWMAGIC.COM Forums!
Please take a look around, and feel free to sign up and join the community.
News Reedy Creek Improvement District and the Central Florida Tourism Oversight District
- Thread starter castlecake2.0
- Start date
lazyboy97o
Well-Known Member
Oh look, a new member joining just to lie.
Trying to make a case about the governor appointing the board members would be might be the dumbest legal move Disney could make, and in this case it would have plenty of competition (I really loved the "But universal got a district filing). The governor almost always appoints the first board of a special district, just like the governor at the time did for Reedy Creek.
Or an existing member with a new account
Its literally in the audit:
"Disney exercised undue influence over the RCID’s operations in many ways, including by influencing the RCID’s permit decisions. Other non-Disney District taxpayers were aware that if they chose vendors not approved by Disney for their construction and development projects, theycould expect the RCID to delay issuing them required permits for one quarter. This improperly coerced non-Disney District taxpayers into preferring Disney-approved vendors"
So you're saying all the other taxpayers in the district were lying?
Not to say anything about the actual report, that's wholly different than saying RCID would rubber stamp everything. No, Disney and all other potential projects needed to go through a permitting process. Perhaps it was delayed if it was a non-preferred vendor, but that does not indicate it was rubber stamped without needing the required documentation, plans, and inspections required to proceed.
Some of us suspect the audit contains lies, distortions and misrepresentations.
Disney controlled who the board members were. The RCID lawyers were the Disney Lawyers (at least part of the time). You really think Disney permits were denied or went through the full process?
the parking garages are a benefit to the district. And now it doesn’t matter who the taxpayers are because they currently have ZERO say in how their taxes are spent. The governor is the one pulling crap.
There are certain things they can't distort. They cant distort RCID using municipal bonds to build the parking garages at Disney Spring or that such bonds are to be used for the benefit of the district. If in the case of what other taxpayers said, the auditors would be held for libel if they misrepresented what the taxpayers said.
Stripes
Well-Known Member
Disney pays 90% of the taxes within the district, but just for the record, the parking garages do benefit other taxpayers given that Disney is not the only property owner at Disney Springs and the fact that property taxes gets passed down to the tenants at Disney Springs even on Disney-owned land.
So you are saying people are parking at Disney Springs and walking over to the Marriot while crossing I4? Why arent they parking at the marriot?
Also can you show special district where the initial board was not appointed by the governor? How many people from Marriot were on the RCID board?
So anyone can build on Disney Springs without Disney approval?
Stripes
Well-Known Member
Nobody in the district can build anything without Disney approval. Even to this day. Disney has covenants in place with every property owner that prevent them from building anything without Disney’s review and permission.
Precedent was set in Miami before the Disney Springs garages were built when a special district built, using bonds, a parking garage to serve a privately-owned shopping mall. Now, if you want to argue that the Disney Springs garages shouldn’t have been financed in the manner they were, that’s fine. But those garages are not the only ones in Florida financed in that manner. That district was also controlled by a private property developer.
flynnibus
Premium Member
Ok, since people seem to have a resistence or fear of reading the judgement from the Judge... let me try to break it down for you in a more digestable format. There will be some paraphrasing here and simplification to try to make it easier to follow.. vs supporting each point with the cites (as that seems to be what buries people).
So let's go...
The Judge was answering on two motions to dismiss the case. One motion from the Governor and Sec of State as defendants and one from the CFTOD board (or 'district' as I'll refer to them). They are separate motions because they were arguing to dismiss the case against each group on different reasons.
1 - For the Governor and Sec of State argued to dismiss based on lack of standing and immunity based on the 11th amendment
2 - District moved to dismiss based on the the merits of the law itself being valid
The judgement addresses each of these in turn - so let's do the same.
Governor and Sec of State
TLDR - The judge found Disney lacked standing against the Gov and Sec of Defense
Standing required “Standing requires three elements: “(1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision”
The judge found Disney has alleged enough for standing against the District as defendants, but not the Gov or Sec of State.
Judge said
For the Governor, Disney argued the Gov’s power to appoint the board members and his ability to assert control over them is what links him to their injury. The Judge did not agree.
For the appointment angle, the Judge said those appointments are in the past - so its not relevant because Disney is seeking injunctive relief in this case so they must show a imminent future injury (this is the one that doesn’t sit well with me…).
Adding “[Disney] has not alleged facts showing that any imminent future appointments will contribute to its harm”
Adding “Stopping hypothetical future appointments would not redress any alleged imminent harm” — Yet.. he acknowledged that the board’s power to control land issues without Disney say WAS the injury…
To the argument that the board members are under the control of the Gov.. he basically just says Disney hasn’t made any allegations that say they were controlled by the Gov.
“Disney has not alleged any specific actions the new board took (or will take) because of the Governor’s alleged control. In fact, Disney has not alleged any specific injury from any board action.”
(expect this to be an area of change in a future case...)
Then, based on the idea that any injunction would not replace the boards existence and doesn’t change that Disney still would still be injured the same, he concludes that the Gov’s role of selecting the board is not material to this standing argument…. Because who he picks for the board doesn’t address Disney’s injury. So no standing against the Gov.
(Now.. this is another area I find issue with... it's all predicated on the idea that case as presented, can't undo the prior law. This is where I expect Disney would change their argument in a followup)
For the Secretary of State -
Judge said Disney didn’t point out any injury directly attributable to the Sec of State (requirement #1 and #2) so there was no standing there. Disney had pointed out a role the Sec of State has to “maintain the list of Special Districts” but the judge said that role doesn’t affect the board’s authority… so not the Sec is not tradable to actions of the board. No standing against the Sec.
As such… grants the motion to drop the Gov and Sec of State from the case. THIS IS WHERE STANDING ARGUMENTS STOP. Note, Judge already said Disney has proven standing against the district and board.
On the matter of motion #2 - motion to dismiss from the district
The Judge concluded Disney’s case has no merit because of the prior precedent set by the Hubbard case in the 11th district. Citing “when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose”
This boils down to the idea that as long as the law itself is “facially constitutional” meaning.. something the government is entitled to do anyways by the constitution, it can’t be challenged on the basis of free speech. This obviously is a HUGE gapping hole in the very principal of the 1st amendment — which in itself is supposed to limit what laws can do. Yet, this POV basically says.. nah, if you can create that law with other powers… 1st amendment claims are not relevant. (obviously its more nuanced than that.. but that's the principal the Judge holds central in his application of Hubbard)
The judge states “The laws here, as in Hubbard, do not facially “impinge on any constitutional rights.”” — Hence focusing the fight just on the retaliatory motive, which is why he applies the conclusion from Hubbard so directly. “And as in Hubbard, the only basis for the claim here is that the Legislature had a retaliatory motive. So as in Hubbard, there is no “cognizable First Amendment claim.””
The judge highlights that in the Hubbard case.. what is key is that the law itself didn’t ban anything that was itself constitutionally protected, but that the fight was that the change was retaliation over 1A protected speech. (IMO - this is also where Disney’s case radically differs… the motivation point is the same, but what was changed had other protections not covered by Hubbard)
To balance that, there are a number of exceptions in the prior case law to say “unless X is happening”. The rest of the document is the Judge dismissing each of Disney’s claims of those exceptions being relevant in this matter.
Dismissing the challenges to Hubbard's application
Motivation behind the law
Disney cited cases that showed the courts WOULD inquire into motivation behind the law… but the judge points out those weren’t just free-speech cases (but other forms of protected classes).. while Hubbard/O’Brian is bound to only be free-speech. (So instead of taking on a 1A look outside of Hubbard’s conclusions.. he concludes this point doesn’t avoid Hubbard :/ )
Targeting Disney
Next.. Disney claimed Hubbard doesn’t apply because the law targeted them. “Second, Disney contends that the challenged laws explicitly target it, making Hubbard inapplicable. The Hubbard principle does not apply when “a law is challenged as a bill of attainder.””
The judge dismisses Disney’s assertion that they were the target of the law because the law doesn’t “pinpoint” Disney. And that the law was not limited only to Disney, but to the other special districts. Basically, the judge is taking a very literal stance and denying Disney’s challenges that the law singled out Disney… because Disney isn’t the only landowner and because the law impacted other special districts. (So basically, because the state was willing to throw others under the bus WITH Disney… they get to screw Disney…)
Conclusion by Judge
And again.. instead of recognizing the case may exceed Hubbard’s precedent - instead the Judge clings to its Hubbard’s limitations as what can be a 1A free speech challenge. “Regardless, nothing in Hubbard suggests it is inapplicable when there is significant—or even overwhelming—evidence of illicit motivation. It says instead that there is no cognizable claim. Period.”
So basically the judge concludes Hubbard's standard of "facially constitutional" is the only thing that matters here, and because Disney didn't challenge that, there case has no merit... dismissed.
So let's go...
The Judge was answering on two motions to dismiss the case. One motion from the Governor and Sec of State as defendants and one from the CFTOD board (or 'district' as I'll refer to them). They are separate motions because they were arguing to dismiss the case against each group on different reasons.
1 - For the Governor and Sec of State argued to dismiss based on lack of standing and immunity based on the 11th amendment
2 - District moved to dismiss based on the the merits of the law itself being valid
The judgement addresses each of these in turn - so let's do the same.
Governor and Sec of State
TLDR - The judge found Disney lacked standing against the Gov and Sec of Defense
Standing required “Standing requires three elements: “(1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision”
The judge found Disney has alleged enough for standing against the District as defendants, but not the Gov or Sec of State.
Judge said
- Disneys loss of control of voting rights in the Disney was enough to satisfy requirement #1 - injury. “Now it faces landuse decisions by a board over which it has no control” — This is important because it points to the condition setup AFTERWARDS as the injury… not the actual action of the CHANGE as the injury.
- And that injury of landuse decisions is clearly traceable to the board - so that satisfies requirement #2 - traceable to the defendant
- And that possible injunctions precluding the board from doing something would redress Disney’s injury.. so requirement #3 satisfied
For the Governor, Disney argued the Gov’s power to appoint the board members and his ability to assert control over them is what links him to their injury. The Judge did not agree.
For the appointment angle, the Judge said those appointments are in the past - so its not relevant because Disney is seeking injunctive relief in this case so they must show a imminent future injury (this is the one that doesn’t sit well with me…).
Adding “[Disney] has not alleged facts showing that any imminent future appointments will contribute to its harm”
Adding “Stopping hypothetical future appointments would not redress any alleged imminent harm” — Yet.. he acknowledged that the board’s power to control land issues without Disney say WAS the injury…
To the argument that the board members are under the control of the Gov.. he basically just says Disney hasn’t made any allegations that say they were controlled by the Gov.
“Disney has not alleged any specific actions the new board took (or will take) because of the Governor’s alleged control. In fact, Disney has not alleged any specific injury from any board action.”
(expect this to be an area of change in a future case...)
Then, based on the idea that any injunction would not replace the boards existence and doesn’t change that Disney still would still be injured the same, he concludes that the Gov’s role of selecting the board is not material to this standing argument…. Because who he picks for the board doesn’t address Disney’s injury. So no standing against the Gov.
(Now.. this is another area I find issue with... it's all predicated on the idea that case as presented, can't undo the prior law. This is where I expect Disney would change their argument in a followup)
For the Secretary of State -
Judge said Disney didn’t point out any injury directly attributable to the Sec of State (requirement #1 and #2) so there was no standing there. Disney had pointed out a role the Sec of State has to “maintain the list of Special Districts” but the judge said that role doesn’t affect the board’s authority… so not the Sec is not tradable to actions of the board. No standing against the Sec.
As such… grants the motion to drop the Gov and Sec of State from the case. THIS IS WHERE STANDING ARGUMENTS STOP. Note, Judge already said Disney has proven standing against the district and board.
On the matter of motion #2 - motion to dismiss from the district
The Judge concluded Disney’s case has no merit because of the prior precedent set by the Hubbard case in the 11th district. Citing “when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose”
This boils down to the idea that as long as the law itself is “facially constitutional” meaning.. something the government is entitled to do anyways by the constitution, it can’t be challenged on the basis of free speech. This obviously is a HUGE gapping hole in the very principal of the 1st amendment — which in itself is supposed to limit what laws can do. Yet, this POV basically says.. nah, if you can create that law with other powers… 1st amendment claims are not relevant. (obviously its more nuanced than that.. but that's the principal the Judge holds central in his application of Hubbard)
The judge states “The laws here, as in Hubbard, do not facially “impinge on any constitutional rights.”” — Hence focusing the fight just on the retaliatory motive, which is why he applies the conclusion from Hubbard so directly. “And as in Hubbard, the only basis for the claim here is that the Legislature had a retaliatory motive. So as in Hubbard, there is no “cognizable First Amendment claim.””
The judge highlights that in the Hubbard case.. what is key is that the law itself didn’t ban anything that was itself constitutionally protected, but that the fight was that the change was retaliation over 1A protected speech. (IMO - this is also where Disney’s case radically differs… the motivation point is the same, but what was changed had other protections not covered by Hubbard)
To balance that, there are a number of exceptions in the prior case law to say “unless X is happening”. The rest of the document is the Judge dismissing each of Disney’s claims of those exceptions being relevant in this matter.
Dismissing the challenges to Hubbard's application
Motivation behind the law
Disney cited cases that showed the courts WOULD inquire into motivation behind the law… but the judge points out those weren’t just free-speech cases (but other forms of protected classes).. while Hubbard/O’Brian is bound to only be free-speech. (So instead of taking on a 1A look outside of Hubbard’s conclusions.. he concludes this point doesn’t avoid Hubbard :/ )
Targeting Disney
Next.. Disney claimed Hubbard doesn’t apply because the law targeted them. “Second, Disney contends that the challenged laws explicitly target it, making Hubbard inapplicable. The Hubbard principle does not apply when “a law is challenged as a bill of attainder.””
The judge dismisses Disney’s assertion that they were the target of the law because the law doesn’t “pinpoint” Disney. And that the law was not limited only to Disney, but to the other special districts. Basically, the judge is taking a very literal stance and denying Disney’s challenges that the law singled out Disney… because Disney isn’t the only landowner and because the law impacted other special districts. (So basically, because the state was willing to throw others under the bus WITH Disney… they get to screw Disney…)
Conclusion by Judge
And again.. instead of recognizing the case may exceed Hubbard’s precedent - instead the Judge clings to its Hubbard’s limitations as what can be a 1A free speech challenge. “Regardless, nothing in Hubbard suggests it is inapplicable when there is significant—or even overwhelming—evidence of illicit motivation. It says instead that there is no cognizable claim. Period.”
So basically the judge concludes Hubbard's standard of "facially constitutional" is the only thing that matters here, and because Disney didn't challenge that, there case has no merit... dismissed.
flynnibus
Premium Member
Basically... because the judge limits the case down to being against the board alone... and the board hasn't really done anything yet to limit Disney's free-speech... the whole 1A case basically gets ignored. Expect Disney to get back to challenging the state... to focus on the creation of the law and the injury it creates and trying to get the 1A evaluation outside the scope of Hubbard's definitions.
Chi84
Premium Member
Actually, the law favors a determination on the merits of a case. A dismissal for failure to state a cause of action cuts off the litigation at the earliest stage. It’s the most difficult burden to meet at the trial level and therefore the easiest to challenge on appeal.
There are no fact-findings to be accorded deference so review is de novo. The appeals court can simply substitute its interpretation of the law for that of the trial court.
The current board is not the initial board of the district.
The CFTOD is not a new district. It's the same district formerly called RCID.
Only the name changed.
The former board elected by the constituents of the district was replaced by a governor appointed board with no accountability to those constituents.
