Ok, since people seem to have a resistence or fear of reading the judgement from the Judge... let me try to break it down for you in a more digestable format. There will be some paraphrasing here and simplification to try to make it easier to follow.. vs supporting each point with the cites (as that seems to be what buries people).
So let's go...
The Judge was answering on two motions to dismiss the case. One motion from the Governor and Sec of State as defendants and one from the CFTOD board (or 'district' as I'll refer to them). They are separate motions because they were arguing to dismiss the case against each group on different reasons.
1 - For the Governor and Sec of State argued to dismiss based on lack of standing and immunity based on the 11th amendment
2 - District moved to dismiss based on the the merits of the law itself being valid
The judgement addresses each of these in turn - so let's do the same.
Governor and Sec of State
TLDR - The judge found Disney lacked standing against the Gov and Sec of Defense
Standing required “Standing requires three elements: “(1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision”
The judge found Disney has alleged enough for standing against the District as defendants, but not the Gov or Sec of State.
Judge said
- Disneys loss of control of voting rights in the Disney was enough to satisfy requirement #1 - injury. “Now it faces landuse decisions by a board over which it has no control” — This is important because it points to the condition setup AFTERWARDS as the injury… not the actual action of the CHANGE as the injury.
- And that injury of landuse decisions is clearly traceable to the board - so that satisfies requirement #2 - traceable to the defendant
- And that possible injunctions precluding the board from doing something would redress Disney’s injury.. so requirement #3 satisfied
The District counter argued that injunction could not restore the old board… so it wouldn’t satisfy Disney’s need of redress. Judge said relief does not need t
o be complete to satisfy the standing requirement..
so he says Disney has established standing against the board.
For the Governor, Disney argued the Gov’s power to appoint the board members and his ability to assert control over them is what links him to their injury. The Judge did not agree.
For the appointment angle, the Judge said those appointments are in the past - so its not relevant because Disney is seeking injunctive relief in this case so they must show a imminent future injury (this is the one that doesn’t sit well with me…).
Adding “[Disney] has not alleged facts showing that any imminent future appointments will contribute to its harm”
Adding “Stopping hypothetical future appointments would not redress any alleged imminent harm” — Yet.. he acknowledged that the board’s power to control land issues without Disney say WAS the injury…
To the argument that the board members are under the control of the Gov.. he basically just says Disney hasn’t made any allegations that say they were controlled by the Gov.
“Disney has not alleged any specific actions the new board took (or will take) because of the Governor’s alleged control. In fact, Disney has not alleged any specific injury from any board action.”
(expect this to be an area of change in a future case...)
Then, based on the idea that any injunction would not replace the boards existence and doesn’t change that Disney still would still be injured the same, he concludes that the Gov’s role of selecting the board is not material to this standing argument…. Because who he picks for the board doesn’t address Disney’s injury. So no standing against the Gov.
(Now.. this is another area I find issue with... it's all predicated on the idea that case as presented, can't undo the prior law. This is where I expect Disney would change their argument in a followup)
For the Secretary of State -
Judge said Disney didn’t point out any injury directly attributable to the Sec of State (requirement #1 and #2) so there was no standing there. Disney had pointed out a role the Sec of State has to “maintain the list of Special Districts” but the judge said that role doesn’t affect the board’s authority… so not the Sec is not tradable to actions of the board. No standing against the Sec.
As such… grants the motion to drop the Gov and Sec of State from the case.
THIS IS WHERE STANDING ARGUMENTS STOP. Note, Judge already said Disney has proven standing against the district and board.
On the matter of motion #2 - motion to dismiss from the district
The Judge concluded Disney’s case has no merit because of the prior precedent set by the Hubbard case in the 11th district. Citing “when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose”
This boils down to the idea that as long as the law itself is “facially constitutional” meaning.. something the government is entitled to do anyways by the constitution, it can’t be challenged on the basis of free speech. This obviously is a HUGE gapping hole in the very principal of the 1st amendment — which in itself is supposed to limit what laws can do. Yet, this POV basically says.. nah, if you can create that law with other powers… 1st amendment claims are not relevant. (obviously its more nuanced than that.. but that's the principal the Judge holds central in his application of Hubbard)
The judge states “The laws here, as in Hubbard, do not facially “impinge on any constitutional rights.”” — Hence focusing the fight just on the retaliatory motive, which is why he applies the conclusion from Hubbard so directly. “And as in Hubbard, the only basis for the claim here is that the Legislature had a retaliatory motive. So as in Hubbard, there is no “cognizable First Amendment claim.””
The judge highlights that in the Hubbard case.. what is key is that the law itself didn’t ban anything that was itself constitutionally protected,
but that the fight was that the change was retaliation over 1A protected speech. (IMO - this is also where Disney’s case radically differs… the motivation point is the same, but what was changed had other protections not covered by Hubbard)
To balance that, there are a number of exceptions in the prior case law to say “unless X is happening”. The rest of the document is the Judge dismissing each of Disney’s claims of those exceptions being relevant in this matter.
Dismissing the challenges to Hubbard's application
Motivation behind the law
Disney cited cases that showed the courts WOULD inquire into motivation behind the law… but the judge points out those weren’t just free-speech cases (but other forms of protected classes).. while Hubbard/O’Brian is bound to only be free-speech. (So instead of taking on a 1A look outside of Hubbard’s conclusions.. he concludes this point doesn’t avoid Hubbard :/ )
Targeting Disney
Next.. Disney claimed Hubbard doesn’t apply because the law targeted them. “Second, Disney contends that the challenged laws explicitly target it, making Hubbard inapplicable. The Hubbard principle does not apply when “a law is challenged as a bill of attainder.””
The judge dismisses Disney’s assertion that they were the target of the law because the law doesn’t “pinpoint” Disney. And that the law was not limited only to Disney, but to the other special districts. Basically, the judge is taking a very literal stance and denying Disney’s challenges that the law singled out Disney… because Disney isn’t the only landowner and because the law impacted other special districts. (So basically, because the state was willing to throw others under the bus WITH Disney… they get to screw Disney…)
Conclusion by Judge
And again.. instead of recognizing the case may exceed Hubbard’s precedent - instead the Judge clings to its Hubbard’s limitations as what can be a 1A free speech challenge. “Regardless, nothing in Hubbard suggests it is inapplicable when there is significant—or even overwhelming—evidence of illicit motivation. It says instead that there is no cognizable claim. Period.”
So basically the judge concludes Hubbard's standard of "facially constitutional" is the only thing that matters here, and because Disney didn't challenge that, there case has no merit... dismissed.