If correct, I'd hope they'd at least recolor the stripe.
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Monorail Accident
- Thread starter PatNSCT
- Start date
The video shows passengers coming off of Purple in the station, and the CM (with others) trying to determine the fate of the driver in the cab. It would seem unlikely that the train would be moved before the driver was located. This would indicate that the accident took place out on the track, or that the "on the track" photo was taken later after the driver had been extricated. However, if the accident happened on the track it makes sense that they might move the trains into the station for easier access. It doesn't really make sense the other way.
donsullivan
Premium Member
One segment showed them hanging a black curtain in one area (couldn't tell where), and then a later sequence showed what looked like a temporary wall similar to a refurb wall you might see in a park being built alongside one of the trains inside the Monorail station.
BadTigger
Active Member
I'm a bit confused...
The new reports the crash occured on the Epcot beam, and from the crash picture, it happened just outside the TTC.
But from the home vide and some newer images of the same portion of the train, it looks like the train is in the TTC.
So, what's the timeline here?
Why and how did the trains get moved after the crash? From the first photo the crash was not in the station, and then the second photo and video indicates the monorail is in the station.
And the movement occured before Reedy Creek arrived? Can i assume this since they were not visible in the video as guests were trying to help the driver?
Or was the crash in the station and then later moved (pics are in the wrong order..)
Thoughts?
**edit*, it might have happened mid beam just before the TTC station and they ended up pulling the back train into the TTC to get to them
CaptainMichael
Well-Known Member
Very few people drive monorails "long term" or as a career. Most of the cast in Watercraft and Monorails are either young people on their college program or their first job and the other majority is comprised of retirees who come from all backgrounds. Again, it could happen to anyone of any age. Don't assume that just because someone is older, they are better and more responsible when it comes to driving monorails (or boats)...trust me.
hardcard
New Member
I'm a bit confused...
The new reports the crash occured on the Epcot beam, and from the crash picture, it happened just outside the TTC.
But from the home vide and some newer images of the same portion of the train, it looks like the train is in the TTC.
So, what's the timeline here?
Why and how did the trains get moved after the crash? From the first photo the crash was not in the station, and then the second photo and video indicates the monorail is in the station.
And the movement occured before Reedy Creek arrived? Can i assume this since they were not visible in the video as guests were trying to help the driver?
Or was the crash in the station and then later moved (pics are in the wrong order..)
Thoughts?
Crash occured outside of the TTC, trains were brought into TTC to evac.. not sure how, pink may have 'drug' purple into the station in an attempt to get the loaded parties off.. the video on the sentinel site shows people leaving the head car behind the cab with a stroller and what not..
EPCOT Explorer
New Member
UGHHH...And they just had new safety device installed this past week for Evacs.
donsullivan
Premium Member
Completely understand that, and it's as it should be at this stage.
I'm simply suggesting that with the likelihood that the monorail will be closed for at least some period of time while they investigate, they'll want to use that space going forward for transport to-and-from Magic Kingdom since the ferries simply aren't enough capacity for a busy summer day at MK.
jt04
Well-Known Member
You keep saying "it could happen to anyone" as if you know the cause and don't believe the driver was at fault. I'm missing your point (as usual). Are you saying inexperience and/or irresponsibility could not be factors? :shrug:
bingie
Well-Known Member
Right...
It's strange how the monorail would have been brought into the TTC to evac, without Reedy Creek being present (they are not seen in the video).
radiohost
Well-Known Member
bingie
Well-Known Member
Looking forward to official details...
CaptainMichael
Well-Known Member
For those who don't know, ferries can hold up to 600 guests. Each monorail train can hold about 400 and load and depart much more quickly than a ferry boat.
Fievel
RunDisney Addict
Probably evac procedures to get it into the station as fast as possible, but I'm guessing it happened in the station.
hardcard
New Member
I think he was saying that things happen to anyone.. tragedy does not age discriminate.
DisneylandRRGuy
New Member
this from micechat.com from a poster
Hi guys,
I'm a former Mark VI railie, and I stay in touch with a fair number of folks in the department. Here's what I've heard. I'm going to stress that it's what I've heard, and I can't represent this as absolute fact. Take that for what it's worth.
The short, short version is that Monorail Central cleared Monorail Pink in reverse into the Concourse (the Epcot side of the TTC) station without being aware that Monorail Purple was still in the station. Pink was cleared with MAPO override, meaning that the driver would have disabled the anti-collision system (there are a variety of legitimate reasons for doing this), and would have been acting on faith that Central wouldn't have cleared him into a dangerous situation because it sometimes is difficult to see everything you'd want to in the cab mirrors, particularly at night on a curve such as the one he was backing along. For whatever reason, Purple just sat in the station without attempting to avoid the accident, and was struck by Pink moving at the full 15 mph allowed during MAPO override. From what I understand, the driver of Purple was a new transfer from another department. Why Central would not have made sure the station was clear before moving any trains is a bit of a mystery, but I've heard that no one was actually in the control console (the control tower-looking place at Concourse) at the time. To my knowledge, there were no electrical or mechanical problems in play here. Again, I have to stress that I'm relating what I've heard, and I was not there. This is a second-hand account from others more familiar with the situation.
Okay, speculation time.
Why would Purple have just sat in the station and let himself get hit? Well, it was a new driver from what I understand, and when Pink got close enough to trigger Purple's MAPO system, it's quite possible that the driver of Purple freaked a little bit (any time a driver gets an unexpected red MAPO light, it gets their attention), and was so intent on looking at his console trying to figure out what was going on that he simply did not see Pink barreling down on him. I suppose it's also possible that the Concourse station didn't have power at the time, preventing Purple from leaving, but I rather doubt that was the case.
Why would Central clear a train into an occupied station? Inattention, most likely. As I said, I'd heard that Central was not at the console at the time of the accident. IMO, if this is the case, it's the root cause of the accident and whoever was Central should be strung up.
Also, here's a little primer on how the anti-collision system on the WDW trains works, since there seems to be some confusion as to how the system works:
The system at Disney is called the MAPO system, or more precisely the Moving Blocklight System (MBS). It consists of a number of transmitters along the beam every 7-10 pylons or so that place RF signals of three different frequencies onto the positive buss bar (power rail), and a corresponding receiver in each train. The trains are wired with a capacitor that shorts the MAPO signals to ground, preventing any signals generated ahead of the train from getting past it. The transmitters are arranged sequentially around the beam- if any given transmitter is putting out frequency #1, then the next one will be emitting frequency #2, and the next one after that will have frequency #3. The one after that will be transmitting frequency #1 again, and the cycle continues all the way around the beam. The upshot of this is that in normal operation, the following distance should be such that there will be three or more transmitters between a given train and the train ahead of him, thus the following train will "see" all three frequencies, and the driver will have a green MBS light on his console. As he begins to get close to the leading train, there will only be two transmitters separating the trains, and the leading train will be shorting out the third MAPO frequency being generated by the next transmitter ahead of it. The following train will then see only two frequencies, and the yellow MBS light illuminates on the driver's console. This signals the driver that he needs to stop at the next designated holdpoint until his MBS indicator turns green again (i.e., the leading train has gone far enough away that there are now again three or more transmitters between the two trains). If the driver ignores the yellow MBS light and continues on, then the following train will only have one transmitter between it and the leading train. This triggers an emergency stop on the following train, with a big ol' blinking red light (a "red MAPO") to let the driver know he screwed up, and a corresponding entry is made in the train's daily event log. It's a reasonably fail-safe system, meaning that if there are problems with the system itself, it will result in a train being stopped instead of being allowed to continue into a dangerous situation. It's not rocket science, and is similar to moving blocklight systems used on subways and other similar systems. Being so simple, the system is pretty reliable, although it rarely can get a bit flaky during thunderstorms, resulting in the occasional yellow MBS light even though there may be a mile or more between trains.
However, there are a number of situations where the MAPO system needs to be turned off, and for that, there's a "MAPO override" button on the console, which allows the driver to do just that. When MAPO override is active, the train is limited to 15 mph, and the driver has to continue to hold the button down to keep the system overridden. Some examples of when the system needs to be overridden are when trains are on any of the spurlines (since they have no MAPO transmitters), or when trains are being switched between beams.
Anyway, regardless of what actually did happen, my thoughts go out to the family of the driver that died, and also to the driver of Pink, who I'm sure is living with his own awful grief. No one should have to deal with this kind of stuff for a crappy hourly position, and I hope that this sad event brings some (IMO) much-needed change in the Transportation Department management.
Hi guys,
I'm a former Mark VI railie, and I stay in touch with a fair number of folks in the department. Here's what I've heard. I'm going to stress that it's what I've heard, and I can't represent this as absolute fact. Take that for what it's worth.
The short, short version is that Monorail Central cleared Monorail Pink in reverse into the Concourse (the Epcot side of the TTC) station without being aware that Monorail Purple was still in the station. Pink was cleared with MAPO override, meaning that the driver would have disabled the anti-collision system (there are a variety of legitimate reasons for doing this), and would have been acting on faith that Central wouldn't have cleared him into a dangerous situation because it sometimes is difficult to see everything you'd want to in the cab mirrors, particularly at night on a curve such as the one he was backing along. For whatever reason, Purple just sat in the station without attempting to avoid the accident, and was struck by Pink moving at the full 15 mph allowed during MAPO override. From what I understand, the driver of Purple was a new transfer from another department. Why Central would not have made sure the station was clear before moving any trains is a bit of a mystery, but I've heard that no one was actually in the control console (the control tower-looking place at Concourse) at the time. To my knowledge, there were no electrical or mechanical problems in play here. Again, I have to stress that I'm relating what I've heard, and I was not there. This is a second-hand account from others more familiar with the situation.
Okay, speculation time.
Why would Purple have just sat in the station and let himself get hit? Well, it was a new driver from what I understand, and when Pink got close enough to trigger Purple's MAPO system, it's quite possible that the driver of Purple freaked a little bit (any time a driver gets an unexpected red MAPO light, it gets their attention), and was so intent on looking at his console trying to figure out what was going on that he simply did not see Pink barreling down on him. I suppose it's also possible that the Concourse station didn't have power at the time, preventing Purple from leaving, but I rather doubt that was the case.
Why would Central clear a train into an occupied station? Inattention, most likely. As I said, I'd heard that Central was not at the console at the time of the accident. IMO, if this is the case, it's the root cause of the accident and whoever was Central should be strung up.
Also, here's a little primer on how the anti-collision system on the WDW trains works, since there seems to be some confusion as to how the system works:
The system at Disney is called the MAPO system, or more precisely the Moving Blocklight System (MBS). It consists of a number of transmitters along the beam every 7-10 pylons or so that place RF signals of three different frequencies onto the positive buss bar (power rail), and a corresponding receiver in each train. The trains are wired with a capacitor that shorts the MAPO signals to ground, preventing any signals generated ahead of the train from getting past it. The transmitters are arranged sequentially around the beam- if any given transmitter is putting out frequency #1, then the next one will be emitting frequency #2, and the next one after that will have frequency #3. The one after that will be transmitting frequency #1 again, and the cycle continues all the way around the beam. The upshot of this is that in normal operation, the following distance should be such that there will be three or more transmitters between a given train and the train ahead of him, thus the following train will "see" all three frequencies, and the driver will have a green MBS light on his console. As he begins to get close to the leading train, there will only be two transmitters separating the trains, and the leading train will be shorting out the third MAPO frequency being generated by the next transmitter ahead of it. The following train will then see only two frequencies, and the yellow MBS light illuminates on the driver's console. This signals the driver that he needs to stop at the next designated holdpoint until his MBS indicator turns green again (i.e., the leading train has gone far enough away that there are now again three or more transmitters between the two trains). If the driver ignores the yellow MBS light and continues on, then the following train will only have one transmitter between it and the leading train. This triggers an emergency stop on the following train, with a big ol' blinking red light (a "red MAPO") to let the driver know he screwed up, and a corresponding entry is made in the train's daily event log. It's a reasonably fail-safe system, meaning that if there are problems with the system itself, it will result in a train being stopped instead of being allowed to continue into a dangerous situation. It's not rocket science, and is similar to moving blocklight systems used on subways and other similar systems. Being so simple, the system is pretty reliable, although it rarely can get a bit flaky during thunderstorms, resulting in the occasional yellow MBS light even though there may be a mile or more between trains.
However, there are a number of situations where the MAPO system needs to be turned off, and for that, there's a "MAPO override" button on the console, which allows the driver to do just that. When MAPO override is active, the train is limited to 15 mph, and the driver has to continue to hold the button down to keep the system overridden. Some examples of when the system needs to be overridden are when trains are on any of the spurlines (since they have no MAPO transmitters), or when trains are being switched between beams.
Anyway, regardless of what actually did happen, my thoughts go out to the family of the driver that died, and also to the driver of Pink, who I'm sure is living with his own awful grief. No one should have to deal with this kind of stuff for a crappy hourly position, and I hope that this sad event brings some (IMO) much-needed change in the Transportation Department management.
DonaldDoleWhip
Well-Known Member
On a bus from MK to WL. Just drove by TTC, and monorail pink is still sitting there.
This is really sad news...
This is really sad news...
CaptainMichael
Well-Known Member
I'm saying that these two things are not limited to 21 year old monorail pilots having worked with all ages.
jt04
Well-Known Member
Not to be trite but age (and experience) can be a factor in tragedies. I'm as sensitive to age discrimination as anyone but it has to be looked at as a possible factor. To not do so would be irresponsible.