Everything below is taken word-for-word from a real case (footnotes omitted.) With recent posts regarding injuries and lawsuits, this brief offers a judge's verbage and reasoning that not everyone may have access to. Although not a new case, I found this one somewhat entertaining, and even humorous.
JAMES TROSCLAIR, ET AL. v. WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-2317 SECTION "N"
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendant's motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
JUDGES: CLEMENT
OPINIONBY: EDITH BROWN CLEMENT
OPINION: ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant's Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment were decided this date on memoranda. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT, and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
"WE'RE GOING TO DISNEY WORLD"
The Trosclairs, a family from Louisiana, made their annual holiday pilgrimage to Walt Disney World, a Florida amusement park, in December 1988. The Trosclairs allege that they incurred injuries while riding the "Space Mountain" roller coaster at about 9:30 p.m. on Christmas day. They contend that the ride stopped suddenly, causing them to suffer serious injuries. They have brought this tort action against defendant Walt Disney World Company (Disney), the owner and operator of the amusement park. Disney has moved for summary judgment.
James and Karen Trosclair have submitted affidavits stating that they are familiar with the operation of the Space Mountain roller coaster, and that "the sudden unexpected stop which [they] experienced was not within the normal operation of [*2] the ride as experienced by [them] on prior occasions." In addition, they have testified that they "witnessed manual operation and stopping of the passenger carriers" by Disney employees on the night in question, a phenomenon they had not witnessed on prior visits to Disney World. The Trosclairs further testified that, at approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 25, 1988, they heard Disney employees "scream the word 'mushroom,' run to a control panel and stop the carriers and then reactivate a portion of the ride."
Disney has submitted the deposition testimony of Ronald Heminger, a Disney employee. Heminger has testified that the stop of the Space Mountain roller coaster at 9:30 p.m. on December 25, 1988 was part of the normal operation of the ride.
THE POISON MUSHROOM
Disney has moved to strike Paragraph VII of the Trosclairs' affidavits, in which the Trosclairs testified that they heard one or more Disney employees scream "mushroom" around the time of the accident. Disney contends that this testimony is inadmissible hearsay, and should be stricken. Disney also contends that the testimony is irrelevant.
Because the "mushroom" statement has no impact on the Court's disposition of [*3] Disney's motion for summary judgment (see analysis below), Disney's motion to strike will be denied as moot.
LAW OF THE MAGIC KINGDOM
This Court held that Florida law applies to the issue of prejudgment interest, and, accordingly, granted Disney's motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. n2 In doing so, the Court noted that the issue of prejudgment interest is substantive, rather than procedural. [*4] Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649, 657 (5th Cir. 1989). Consequently, the Court's choice-of-law analysis on the issue of prejudgment interest is applicable to all substantive tort issues. The Court will apply Florida law.
A NIGHT ON SPACE MOUNTAIN
Under Florida law, it is well settled that the operator of a public amusement is "not the insurer of the safety of its patrons." Payne v. City of Clearwater, 155 Fla. 9, 19 So.2d 406, 408 (1944); Balart v. Michel's Kartway, Inc., 364 So.2d 90, 92 (Fla.App.3d Dist. 1978). Amusement operators "are required to keep their premises in reasonably safe condition commensurate with the business conducted." Walt Disney World v. Goode, 501 So.2d 622, 622-23 (Fla.App.5th Dist. 1986), citing Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35 So.2d 720, 721 (1948). [*5] That duty is "the degree of care that would be expected of an ordinarily careful and prudent person in his position, and his duty is fulfilled when he makes the piece as little dangerous as such a place can reasonably be made, having regard to the contrivances necessarily used in conducting such a place." Payne, 19 So.2d at 408.
For purposes of the present motion for summary judgment, the question is whether a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Disney breached its duty of reasonable care to the plaintiffs.
Disney avers that it has satisfied its duty of care, as a matter of law, because the Trosclairs' injuries occurred during the "normal operation" of the ride. Disney contends that Heminger's deposition testimony conclusively establishes that the ride was operating normally at the time of the incident.
Heminger's testimony is contradicted by the Trosclairs' affidavits. Disney contends that the Trosclairs' affidavits should not be given any credence, as their annual rides on Space Mountain are an insufficient basis for them to claim familiarity with the normal operation of the ride. However, this Court cannot [*6] make credibility or weight-of-the-evidence determinations in deciding a summary judgment motion. Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang Laboratories, 922 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1991). The jury will evaluate the credibility of the Trosclairs' testimony.
In addition, the question of whether the ride was operating normally, while relevant, is not dispositive of whether Disney can be held liable. If the Space Mountain roller coaster is unreasonably dangerous in the course of its normal operation (always comes to an unreasonably dangerous sudden stop), a jury could reasonably find that Disney was negligent in operating the ride.
Based on the Trosclairs' testimony, the jury could reasonably find that the roller coaster came to an unreasonably dangerous sudden stop on the night in question. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
JAMES TROSCLAIR, ET AL. v. WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-2317 SECTION "N"
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendant's motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
JUDGES: CLEMENT
OPINIONBY: EDITH BROWN CLEMENT
OPINION: ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant's Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment were decided this date on memoranda. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT, and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
"WE'RE GOING TO DISNEY WORLD"
The Trosclairs, a family from Louisiana, made their annual holiday pilgrimage to Walt Disney World, a Florida amusement park, in December 1988. The Trosclairs allege that they incurred injuries while riding the "Space Mountain" roller coaster at about 9:30 p.m. on Christmas day. They contend that the ride stopped suddenly, causing them to suffer serious injuries. They have brought this tort action against defendant Walt Disney World Company (Disney), the owner and operator of the amusement park. Disney has moved for summary judgment.
James and Karen Trosclair have submitted affidavits stating that they are familiar with the operation of the Space Mountain roller coaster, and that "the sudden unexpected stop which [they] experienced was not within the normal operation of [*2] the ride as experienced by [them] on prior occasions." In addition, they have testified that they "witnessed manual operation and stopping of the passenger carriers" by Disney employees on the night in question, a phenomenon they had not witnessed on prior visits to Disney World. The Trosclairs further testified that, at approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 25, 1988, they heard Disney employees "scream the word 'mushroom,' run to a control panel and stop the carriers and then reactivate a portion of the ride."
Disney has submitted the deposition testimony of Ronald Heminger, a Disney employee. Heminger has testified that the stop of the Space Mountain roller coaster at 9:30 p.m. on December 25, 1988 was part of the normal operation of the ride.
THE POISON MUSHROOM
Disney has moved to strike Paragraph VII of the Trosclairs' affidavits, in which the Trosclairs testified that they heard one or more Disney employees scream "mushroom" around the time of the accident. Disney contends that this testimony is inadmissible hearsay, and should be stricken. Disney also contends that the testimony is irrelevant.
Because the "mushroom" statement has no impact on the Court's disposition of [*3] Disney's motion for summary judgment (see analysis below), Disney's motion to strike will be denied as moot.
LAW OF THE MAGIC KINGDOM
This Court held that Florida law applies to the issue of prejudgment interest, and, accordingly, granted Disney's motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. n2 In doing so, the Court noted that the issue of prejudgment interest is substantive, rather than procedural. [*4] Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649, 657 (5th Cir. 1989). Consequently, the Court's choice-of-law analysis on the issue of prejudgment interest is applicable to all substantive tort issues. The Court will apply Florida law.
A NIGHT ON SPACE MOUNTAIN
Under Florida law, it is well settled that the operator of a public amusement is "not the insurer of the safety of its patrons." Payne v. City of Clearwater, 155 Fla. 9, 19 So.2d 406, 408 (1944); Balart v. Michel's Kartway, Inc., 364 So.2d 90, 92 (Fla.App.3d Dist. 1978). Amusement operators "are required to keep their premises in reasonably safe condition commensurate with the business conducted." Walt Disney World v. Goode, 501 So.2d 622, 622-23 (Fla.App.5th Dist. 1986), citing Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35 So.2d 720, 721 (1948). [*5] That duty is "the degree of care that would be expected of an ordinarily careful and prudent person in his position, and his duty is fulfilled when he makes the piece as little dangerous as such a place can reasonably be made, having regard to the contrivances necessarily used in conducting such a place." Payne, 19 So.2d at 408.
For purposes of the present motion for summary judgment, the question is whether a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that Disney breached its duty of reasonable care to the plaintiffs.
Disney avers that it has satisfied its duty of care, as a matter of law, because the Trosclairs' injuries occurred during the "normal operation" of the ride. Disney contends that Heminger's deposition testimony conclusively establishes that the ride was operating normally at the time of the incident.
Heminger's testimony is contradicted by the Trosclairs' affidavits. Disney contends that the Trosclairs' affidavits should not be given any credence, as their annual rides on Space Mountain are an insufficient basis for them to claim familiarity with the normal operation of the ride. However, this Court cannot [*6] make credibility or weight-of-the-evidence determinations in deciding a summary judgment motion. Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang Laboratories, 922 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1991). The jury will evaluate the credibility of the Trosclairs' testimony.
In addition, the question of whether the ride was operating normally, while relevant, is not dispositive of whether Disney can be held liable. If the Space Mountain roller coaster is unreasonably dangerous in the course of its normal operation (always comes to an unreasonably dangerous sudden stop), a jury could reasonably find that Disney was negligent in operating the ride.
Based on the Trosclairs' testimony, the jury could reasonably find that the roller coaster came to an unreasonably dangerous sudden stop on the night in question. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to strike is DENIED as MOOT and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.